Privacy and Organizational Persons by Orts, Eric W & Sepinwall, Amy
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Legal Studies and Business Ethics Papers Wharton Faculty Research
2015
Privacy and Organizational Persons
Eric W. Orts
University of Pennsylvania
Amy Sepinwall
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/lgst_papers
Part of the Business Commons, and the Law Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/lgst_papers/19
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Orts, E. W., & Sepinwall, A. (2015). Privacy and Organizational Persons. University of Minnesota Law Review, 99 (6), 2275-2322.
Retrieved from http://repository.upenn.edu/lgst_papers/19
Privacy and Organizational Persons
Abstract
In A Corporate Right to Privacy, Elizabeth Pollman contributes to understanding an important set of issues
that emerges from two large-scale developments in law and society.1 In this Article, we examine Professor
Pollman’s contribution in the context of these larger developments, as well as her narrower claim regarding the
interpretation of constitutional law. The first development concerns the notion of the “legal personality” of the
institutions and organizations that compose the modern world, including: business firms; religious
organizations; nonprofit associations; labor unions; and governments at different levels, ranging from cities to
nation-states to combinations of nation-states in global bodies such as the European Union, the United
Nations, and the World Trade Organization. A perennial question regarding all of these artificially created but
socially real institutional “persons” concerns the appropriate scope of their legal powers and rights in different
contexts.2
Recent United States Supreme Court opinions, for example, have expanded constitutional and statutory rights
for business corporations. Citizens United recognized a constitutional right to contribute to political debates
and elections in terms of “free speech” purchased with corporate money.3 Hobby Lobby found religiously
oriented business corporations to qualify for legal exclusions from health care statutes of general application
on grounds that forcing financial support of certain methods of contraception would violate a firm’s rights of
“free exercise” of religion.4 The fascinating question Professor Pollman asks is whether these and other
precedents might extend also to recognizing a constitutional “right of privacy” for corporate firms in various
circumstances.
The second large-scale development concerns the trajectory of legal and social concerns about privacy—and
an expanding (or contracting) recognition of “rights of privacy.” The rise of individualism in Western
societies—which has been exported unevenly to other parts of the world over the course of the last several
centuries—has brought with it the idea that powerful social institutions, such as government, religious
authority, and business firms, should observe limits with respect to individual autonomy, dignity, and
“personal space.”6 This increasing concern for privacy has influenced constitutional law in the United States.7
Traditional privacy rights that protect “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects,”8 as recognized by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures, have been supplemented by contemporary constitutional rights protecting personal decisions
regarding sexual practices, pregnancy, reproduction, marriage, and family relationships.9 In addition, rights to
privacy regarding some kinds of information—such as personal medical information or internet browsing
history— may be emerging in constitutional law as well as in new statutes.
In this Article, we recognize the enduring value of Professor Pollman’s contribution to understanding an
important corner of the intersection of these two larger trends, namely, the specific question of whether
“corporations” may claim a constitutional “right to privacy” in a manner analogous, for example, to the
assertion of a constitutional right of freedom of speech under the First Amendment affirmed in Citizens
United. Answering this question is no easy task. As Anita Allen, one of the foremost privacy scholars, has
remarked, “fully explicating the reasons for denying . . . privacy rights to corporations is an occasion for
abstract jurisprudence of a sort for which few have the time or temperament.”11 Pollman is an admirable
exception. She collects the relevant legal materials and academic literature with confidence and evident
mastery. Her ambition is impressive, and her approach is remarkably comprehensive. Her article will therefore
serve as an excellent resource for courts and future scholars who will inevitably grapple with many new
problems of “rights of privacy” as they arise in complex organizational situations. We could devote many pages
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to singing the praises of Pollman’s work, but instead we focus here on what we see as some of its conceptual
limitations and make some recommendations for future research in this area.
Our main criticism is that we do not think the conclusion that “most corporations in most circumstances
should not have a constitutional right to privacy” is justified by the normative and legal arguments
presented.12 We point out the range of uncertainty in previous and likely future cases regarding (1) the
changing meanings of “privacy” in various contexts; (2) the different kinds of “corporations” as well as other
organizational forms; and (3) the cogency of claims of corporate constitutional rights, especially privacy
rights. We argue that significant variations in possible and likely future conceptual scenarios, as well as
significant variations in likely factual circumstances, render any conclusion about “most corporations in most
circumstances” tenuous and unsupported both normatively and empirically.13 We also question the
jurisprudential claim that “rights” of corporations (or other human-created institutions) are always narrowly
“derivative” in the sense employed by Pollman. Throughout, we assume that privacy rights are not fully
reducible to other rights.14 We also assume that the distinctive interests that claims of “privacy” aim to cover
are indeed worthy of protection.
We organize our Article as follows. Part I elaborates some methodological concerns in approaching the
general problem of “corporate rights of privacy.” Part II considers the conceptual relationship between
corporations (and other organizational persons) and the idea of rights. We propose a framework that captures
a difference between organizations asserting “primary” and “secondary” rights, which we believe will prove
analytically helpful. Part III expands on the meaning of “privacy” and suggests that the broad conceptual
scope, and indeed its many different meanings, counsels caution when answering whether a corporation may
assert “a right of privacy.”
Part IV discusses the wide range of meanings of “corporation” when used to refer to various types of
associations and organizations—including business, nonprofit, and even government entities. We argue that
nothing particularly special should attach to the corporate form with respect to whether rights regarding
“privacy” should be recognized. Any organized group bestowed with the benefit of formal legal recognition
should probably be included generically in the analysis of specific cases.
Part V turns to consider the problem of organizational composition. Who counts as a member of an
organization, and how does organizational membership translate into the normative language of privacy? We
argue that complications involving group membership in organizations may often lead to different answers
concerning privacy rights claims in different circumstances. Also, different kinds of organizations are created
for different purposes, and these different purposes should also matter for legal and normative analysis.16
In Part VI, we point out another important dimension that falls outside of the scope of Pollman’s analysis but
bears conceptually on a proper normative framing of the problem. In addition to questions of rights of privacy
that may be asserted by organizations such as business corporations, it is important to consider the fact that
many of these same organizations may find themselves tempted to violate the rights of privacy of individuals
(or other organizations), especially in the brave new world of the internet. We thus highlight the threat to
rights of privacy in the twenty-first century posed by large private organizations that have the ability to delve
broadly and deeply into the digital archives of many people’s lives. We conclude that much work remains to be
done in limning the lines of privacy with respect to organizational persons.
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  INTRODUCTION   
In A Corporate Right to Privacy, Elizabeth Pollman con-
tributes to understanding an important set of issues that 
emerges from two large-scale developments in law and society.
1
 
In this Article, we examine Professor Pollman’s contribution in 
the context of these larger developments, as well as her nar-
rower claim regarding the interpretation of constitutional law. 
The first development concerns the notion of the “legal per-
sonality” of the institutions and organizations that compose the 
modern world, including: business firms; religious organiza-
tions; nonprofit associations; labor unions; and governments at 
different levels, ranging from cities to nation-states to combina-
tions of nation-states in global bodies such as the European Un-
ion, the United Nations, and the World Trade Organization. A 
perennial question regarding all of these artificially created but 
socially real institutional “persons” concerns the appropriate 
scope of their legal powers and rights in different contexts.
2
 
 
 † Guardsmark Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics, The 
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, and Assistant Professor of Legal 
Studies and Business Ethics, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylva-
nia, respectively. We thank Faisal Choudhury, Nico Cornell, Saurabh Joshi, 
Elizabeth Pollman, Andrew Siegel, Alan Strudler, and Kevin Werbach for very 
helpful comments and suggestions. Monica Kwok provided excellent research 
assistance. Copyright © 2015 by Eric W. Orts and Amy Sepinwall. 
 1.  Elizabeth Pollman, A Corporate Right to Privacy, 99 MINN. L. REV. 27 
(2014). 
 2.  One of us has argued elsewhere for “squaring the circle” in the debate 
between the nominalists who insist on the fictional and artificial nature of le-
gally created organizations (such as corporations) and the realists who point 
out the social implications and real-world everyday consequences that follow 
from the social construction of legal entities (such as corporations). There is no 
necessary conceptual contradiction dividing the two camps. One can view le-
gally constructed organizations as fictional and artificial (and therefore 
changeable through legal and political decisions) and at the same time socially 
real and powerful (given that legal recognition carries material social conse-
2276 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:2275 
 
Recent United States Supreme Court opinions, for example, 
have expanded constitutional and statutory rights for business 
corporations. Citizens United recognized a constitutional right 
to contribute to political debates and elections in terms of “free 
speech” purchased with corporate money.
3
 Hobby Lobby found 
religiously oriented business corporations to qualify for legal 
exclusions from health care statutes of general application on 
grounds that forcing financial support of certain methods of 
contraception would violate a firm’s rights of “free exercise” of 
religion.
4
 The fascinating question Professor Pollman asks is 
whether these and other precedents might extend also to rec-
ognizing a constitutional “right of privacy” for corporate firms 
in various circumstances.
5
 
The second large-scale development concerns the trajectory 
of legal and social concerns about privacy—and an expanding 
(or contracting) recognition of “rights of privacy.” The rise of in-
dividualism in Western societies—which has been exported un-
evenly to other parts of the world over the course of the last 
several centuries—has brought with it the idea that powerful 
social institutions, such as government, religious authority, and 
business firms, should observe limits with respect to individual 
autonomy, dignity, and “personal space.”
6
 This increasing con-
cern for privacy has influenced constitutional law in the United 
 
quences). See ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE 
FIRM 27–32 (2013) (explaining the legal and practical status of firms as per-
sons). 
 3.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 4.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 5.  Pollman, supra note 1. 
 6.  Theorists exploring privacy as a value and principle have recognized 
its conceptual connections in theories of liberal political orders in which zones 
of private life are legally demarcated as separate from and protected against 
public government. See, e.g., ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT 
MUST WE HIDE? (2011); JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: 
LAW, ETHICS, AND THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY (1997); CHARLES FRIED, AN 
ANATOMY OF VALUES (1970); JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND 
ISOLATION (1992); BEATE RÖSSLER, THE VALUE OF PRIVACY 2–5, 10–13 (R.D.V. 
Glasgow trans., 2005); Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy As an Aspect of Human 
Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964); Ruth 
Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980); Robert 
S. Gerstein, Intimacy and Privacy, 89 ETHICS 76 (1978); W. A. Parent, Privacy, 
Morality, and the Law, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 269 (1983); James Rachels, Why 
Privacy Is Important, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 323 (1975). For a historical overview 
of the beginning of the idea of private life in modern societies from different 
academic perspectives, see A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE (Phillippe Ariès & 
Georges Duby eds., Arthur Goldhammer trans. 1987–91) (five volumes). For 
an engaging contemporary introduction to the general topic, see RAYMOND 
WACKS, PRIVACY: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION (2010). 
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States.
7
 Traditional privacy rights that protect “[t]he right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects,”
8
 as recognized by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, have been sup-
plemented by contemporary constitutional rights protecting 
personal decisions regarding sexual practices, pregnancy, re-
production, marriage, and family relationships.
9
 In addition, 
rights to privacy regarding some kinds of information—such as 
personal medical information or internet browsing history—
may be emerging in constitutional law as well as in new stat-
utes.
10
  
 
 7. Perhaps because of the legacies of fascism and communism, the Euro-
pean Union has sought to protect individual privacy—especially data priva-
cy—even more aggressively than the United States. See, e.g., Jason A. 
Kotzker, Note, The Great Cookie Caper: Internet Privacy and Target Marketing 
at Home and Abroad, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 727, 748 (2003) (“The roots of the 
European theory stem directly from the horrors experienced by Europeans 
during World War II.”). Thus the EU passed the Data Protection Directive in 
1995, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 95/46/EC, while the United States has yet to offer any-
thing more than a patchwork of discrete laws and rules, leaving much of the 
territory to private self-regulation. See Ariel E. Wade, Note, A New Age of Pri-
vacy Protection: A Proposal for an International Personal Data Privacy Treaty, 
42 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 659, 663 (2010). See generally Steven R. Salbu, 
The European Union Data Privacy Directive and International Relations, 35 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 655 (2002). Even though American data privacy pro-
tection may be less comprehensive or systematic compared with that in Eu-
rope, the autonomy and liberty concerns underpinning the value of privacy are 
still undoubtedly strongly felt. 
 8.   U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § 2. 
 9.  See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973) (“The Constitution 
does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line of decisions, howev-
er, going back perhaps as far as [1891], the Court has recognized that a right 
of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does 
exist under the Constitution . . . . These decisions make it clear that . . . the 
right has some extension to activities relating to marriage, procreation, con-
traception, family relationships, and child rearing and education.” (citations 
omitted)); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (right to privacy in 
the choice of sexual partners); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to 
privacy regarding marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
(right to privacy regarding contraception); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 
158 (1944) (right to privacy regarding family decisions about education and 
religion). 
 10.  As Pollman observes, cases on these issues have been mostly based on 
statutory grounds, though some lower court opinions have recognized constitu-
tional rights in the context of protecting personal information. Pollman, supra 
note 1, at 30–31. In this connection, one may interpret the important case of 
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), in somewhat broad-
er terms than does Pollman who nevertheless mentions that the Court recog-
nized “the vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one’s 
associations.” Id. at 462; see also Pollman, supra note 1, at 30 (discussing the 
NAACP case). For a further discussion of the importance of the case, see infra 
notes 60–64 and accompanying text. 
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In this Article, we recognize the enduring value of Profes-
sor Pollman’s contribution to understanding an important cor-
ner of the intersection of these two larger trends, namely, the 
specific question of whether “corporations” may claim a consti-
tutional “right to privacy” in a manner analogous, for example, 
to the assertion of a constitutional right of freedom of speech 
under the First Amendment affirmed in Citizens United. An-
swering this question is no easy task. As Anita Allen, one of the 
foremost privacy scholars, has remarked, “fully explicating the 
reasons for denying . . . privacy rights to corporations is an oc-
casion for abstract jurisprudence of a sort for which few have 
the time or temperament.”
11
 Pollman is an admirable exception. 
She collects the relevant legal materials and academic litera-
ture with confidence and evident mastery. Her ambition is im-
pressive, and her approach is remarkably comprehensive. Her 
article will therefore serve as an excellent resource for courts 
and future scholars who will inevitably grapple with many new 
problems of “rights of privacy” as they arise in complex organi-
zational situations. We could devote many pages to singing the 
praises of Pollman’s work, but instead we focus here on what 
we see as some of its conceptual limitations and make some 
recommendations for future research in this area. 
Our main criticism is that we do not think the conclusion 
that “most corporations in most circumstances should not have 
a constitutional right to privacy” is justified by the normative 
and legal arguments presented.
12
 We point out the range of un-
certainty in previous and likely future cases regarding (1) the 
changing meanings of “privacy” in various contexts; (2) the dif-
ferent kinds of “corporations” as well as other organizational 
forms; and (3) the cogency of claims of corporate constitutional 
rights, especially privacy rights. We argue that significant var-
iations in possible and likely future conceptual scenarios, as 
well as significant variations in likely factual circumstances, 
render any conclusion about “most corporations in most cir-
cumstances” tenuous and unsupported both normatively and 
empirically.
13
 We also question the jurisprudential claim that 
 
 11.  Anita L. Allen, Rethinking the Rules Against Corporate Privacy 
Rights: Some Conceptual Quandries for the Common Law, 20 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 607, 607 (1987). Allen identifies conceptual difficulties with ascribing 
privacy rights to corporations but, unlike Pollman, she believes that much 
constitutional law supports the notion of corporate privacy rights. See id. at 
626–28 (identifying state and federal constitutional provisions that protect 
corporations’ privacy rights). 
 12.  Pollman, supra note 1, at 32, 84. 
 13.  See, e.g., id. at 32 & n.25, 47, 52 n.107, 53–54, 64, 73, 75–77.  
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“rights” of corporations (or other human-created institutions) 
are always narrowly “derivative” in the sense employed by 
Pollman. Throughout, we assume that privacy rights are not 
fully reducible to other rights.
14
 We also assume that the dis-
tinctive interests that claims of “privacy” aim to cover are in-
deed worthy of protection.
15
  
We organize our Article as follows. Part I elaborates some 
methodological concerns in approaching the general problem of 
“corporate rights of privacy.” Part II considers the conceptual 
relationship between corporations (and other organizational 
persons) and the idea of rights. We propose a framework that 
captures a difference between organizations asserting “prima-
ry” and “secondary” rights, which we believe will prove analyti-
cally helpful. Part III expands on the meaning of “privacy” and 
suggests that the broad conceptual scope, and indeed its many 
 
 14.  For a scholarly debate about whether privacy rights have distinctive 
content, or instead fully track rights to property, liberty and so on, compare 
Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295, 313 
(1975) (arguing that privacy rights are derived from other rights), with Thom-
as Scanlon, Thomson on Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 315 (1975) (replying that 
other rights such as “ownership” and “liberty” derive from recognition of a 
right of privacy). Nothing in our argument here turns necessarily on a resolu-
tion of this meta-debate about the nature of the value of privacy in relation to 
other moral values. 
 15.  Theorists from both the right and left have attacked the liberal com-
mitment to privacy rights. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF 
JUSTICE 231–350 (1981) (arguing that the personal interests privacy rights 
protect are inefficient); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality 
Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1311 (1991) (decrying privacy rights because 
they immunize the domestic sphere, a traditional locus of female oppression, 
from legal intervention); Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-
Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394 (2009) (arguing that, 
by casting the right to abortion as a “private” right, the state can legitimate its 
refusal to pay for abortions even for those who cannot afford to pay for a preg-
nancy termination themselves). Our conception of rights assumes that they 
function as “trumps” against efficiency considerations, RONALD DWORKIN, 
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977), and so we are not moved by Posner’s cri-
tique. For a more targeted critique of Posner’s account, see Julie E. Cohen, 
Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject As Object, 52 STAN. L. 
REV. 1373 (2000). We are more sympathetic to the feminist critique of privacy 
but we nonetheless believe that the concerns feminists often raise go to the 
scope of the private sphere, and not to the issue of whether the notion of priva-
cy itself is defensible. 
  For a description of a different source of ambivalence around the value 
of privacy, see Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The 
Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1 (1991) (foregrounding the conflicting commitments in our polity be-
tween “sunlight” (i.e., the imperative to be transparent) and “shadows” (i.e., a 
private sphere free of government intrusion)).  
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different meanings, counsels caution when answering whether 
a corporation may assert “a right of privacy.” 
Part IV discusses the wide range of meanings of “corpora-
tion” when used to refer to various types of associations and or-
ganizations—including business, nonprofit, and even govern-
ment entities. We argue that nothing particularly special 
should attach to the corporate form with respect to whether 
rights regarding “privacy” should be recognized. Any organized 
group bestowed with the benefit of formal legal recognition 
should probably be included generically in the analysis of spe-
cific cases.  
Part V turns to consider the problem of organizational 
composition. Who counts as a member of an organization, and 
how does organizational membership translate into the norma-
tive language of privacy? We argue that complications involv-
ing group membership in organizations may often lead to dif-
ferent answers concerning privacy rights claims in different 
circumstances. Also, different kinds of organizations are creat-
ed for different purposes, and these different purposes should 
also matter for legal and normative analysis.
16
  
In Part VI, we point out another important dimension that 
falls outside of the scope of Pollman’s analysis but bears con-
ceptually on a proper normative framing of the problem. In ad-
dition to questions of rights of privacy that may be asserted by 
organizations such as business corporations, it is important to 
consider the fact that many of these same organizations may 
find themselves tempted to violate the rights of privacy of indi-
viduals (or other organizations), especially in the brave new 
world of the internet. We thus highlight the threat to rights of 
privacy in the twenty-first century posed by large private or-
ganizations that have the ability to delve broadly and deeply 
into the digital archives of many people’s lives. We conclude 
that much work remains to be done in limning the lines of pri-
vacy with respect to organizational persons. 
I.  METHODOLOGY: OF “CORPORATIONS,”  
“RIGHTS,” AND “PRIVACY”   
As various scholars in different disciplines have recog-
nized, the idea of a “right to privacy” has a number of different 
 
 16.  To be fair, Pollman recognizes the importance of “purpose” in conduct-
ing a legal analysis regarding privacy rights asserted by organizations. 
Pollman, supra note 1, at 32, 54–55, 64. We argue, however, that the scope of 
her conception of potential “purposes” of organizations, including corporations 
(whether for-profit or nonprofit), is unduly narrow. 
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meanings in different contexts—ranging from traditional priva-
cy rights connected to freedoms of political speech, religion, and 
association to more recent privacy rights that have been recog-
nized to protect individual personal dignity and autonomy re-
garding decisions about sexual behavior and reproduction. 
Scholars have struggled with defining the meaning of “privacy” 
and its relationship to other fundamental values such as indi-
vidual “autonomy,” “liberty,” and “freedom.”
17
 
Legal scholars have also noticed conceptual difficulties in 
defining the meaning of “privacy.” Daniel Solove, for example,   
identifies six general types or understandings of privacy, with some 
overlap: (1) a right to be let alone (Samuel Warren and Louis Brande-
is’s influential formulation); (2) limited access to self; (3) secrecy or 
concealment of certain matters; (4) control over personal information 
or information about oneself; (5) personhood (protection of one’s per-
sonality, individuality, dignity); and (6) intimacy.
18
  
 
 17.  See, e.g., DECEW, supra note 6, at 9–25 (examining different legal and 
philosophical justifications for a right of privacy); INNESS, supra note 6, at 74–
75 (arguing that privacy essentially involves the protection of “intimacy” in 
relationships); RÖSSLER, supra note 6, at 2–10, 17–18 (providing an analytical 
overview of the literature and advancing her own view of “privacy” as ground-
ed in philosophical conceptions of “autonomy” of individual people to plan and 
make decisions about the course of their own lives); Gavison, supra note 6, at 
423 (arguing that privacy is a coherent value focused on reserving “our acces-
sibility to others: the extent to which we are known to others, the extent to 
which others have physical access to us, and the extent to which we are the 
subject of others’ attention” the protection of which advances other values of 
“the promotion of liberty, autonomy, selfhood, and human relations, and fur-
thering the existence of a free society”); cf. Cohen, supra note 15, at 1380 & 
n.17 (collecting philosophical sources identifying the difficulty of defining pri-
vacy in non-property rhetoric); Julie A. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. 
L. REV. 1904, 1904 (2013) (“No single meme or formulation of privacy’s pur-
pose has emerged around which privacy advocacy might coalesce.”); Rachels, 
supra note 6, at 323 (“Why, exactly, is privacy important to us? There is no one 
simple answer to this question, since people have a number of interests that 
may be harmed by invasions of their privacy.”).  
 18.  Pollman, supra note 1, at 60 (quoting DANIEL J. SOLOVE, 
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 12–13 (2008)); see also Samuel D. Warren & Louis 
D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 219–20 (1890) (argu-
ing in favor of the recognition of a privacy right in the common law). It is 
noteworthy that Warren and Brandeis’ seminal article was motivated by a 
technological invention: the Kodak-style camera and the use of these and oth-
er devices by newspapers. Id. at 195 (“Instantaneous photographs and news-
paper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic 
life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction 
that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-
tops.’”). For the story of Warren’s annoyance over newspaper coverage of the 
details regarding his daughter’s wedding as motivating his recruitment of his 
partner and Harvard Law classmate Brandeis to write the article, see William 
L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 383–84, 423 (1960). The advent of the 
internet and the rise of cell phones with instant imaging and video technolo-
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Solove concludes that the meanings of privacy are so varied 
that it makes better sense to focus on particular situations ra-
ther than to build a general theory of privacy. He argues that 
“privacy” is “a concept in disarray,” and he joins other legal 
scholars who doubt whether a single theory can embrace the 
many meanings and values that “privacy” seems to implicate.
19
 
Moreover, it is not just the meaning of “privacy” that is 
contested. There are also competing conceptions of the “corpo-
ration.”
20
 The question of whether the corporation can bear 
rights in its own organizational capacity has been especially 
 
gies suggest that another legal revolution regarding privacy protection may be 
in train.  
 19.  SOLOVE, supra note 18, at 1–2; see also ARTHUR MILLER, THE 
ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND DOSSIERS 25 (1971) 
(noting that privacy is “difficult to define because it is exasperatingly vague 
and evanescent”); Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 
2087, 2087 (2001) (“Privacy is a value so complex, so entangled in competing 
and contradictory dimensions, so engorged with various and distinct mean-
ings, that I sometimes despair whether it can be usefully addressed at all.”). 
Solove quotes the apt description by Jonathan Franzen that “privacy proves to 
be the Cheshire cat of values: not much substance, but a very winning smile.” 
SOLOVE, supra note 18, at 1 (quoting JONATHAN FRANZEN, HOW TO BE ALONE 
42 (2003)). 
  Solove suggests a problem-oriented approach to solving different kinds 
of “privacy problems” that “arise when governments, businesses, organiza-
tions, and people disrupt the activities of others.” SOLOVE, supra note 18, at 
76. Of course, this is a very broad category! He then suggests a “taxonomy” of 
areas of concern that involve “the value of privacy” to include “four principal 
groups of activities: (1) information collection [such as through surveillance 
and interrogation techniques], (2) information processing [which refers to “the 
use, storage, and manipulation of data that has already been collected”], (3) 
information dissemination [such as breach of confidentiality, blackmail, and 
public exposure of embarrassing personal details], and (4) invasion [including 
problems of intrusion into private spaces such as homes and interference with 
personal decision-making].” Id. at 10–11, 78–170 (italics added). Another legal 
scholar conducting an historical survey of privacy law in the United States 
concludes that there are at least five different categories of privacy law and 
“seeking a simple definition of privacy is a misguided quest.” Ken Gormley, 
One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1335.  
 20. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the 
Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 
30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767, 770–72 (2005) (describing long-term conceptual cy-
cling of several theories of the corporation); John Dewey, The Historic Back-
ground of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 655 (1926) (arguing 
that different theories of legal “person,” including references to corporations, 
are used to signify “what law makes it signify”); Ron Harris, The Transplanta-
tion of the Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality Theories: From German 
Codification to British Political Pluralism and American Big Business, 63 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1421, 1423–27 (2006) (examining historical origins of 
theories of corporate persons and the translation of different theories into dif-
ferent legal cultures).  
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fraught.
21
 And the notion of rights themselves and, in particu-
lar, questions about their purpose and theoretical grounds, 
have also generated extensive debate.
22
 
Beginning from conceptual foundations (including disputes 
about them), then, one might surmise that whether a “right of 
privacy” should extend to an organizational person such as a 
corporation or other association should depend normatively on 
the context: both ontologically with respect to the nature of the 
organization and conceptually with regard to the meaning of 
rights. We might ask (and might urge courts to ask): Which 
kind of privacy is involved in a particular case? What is the role 
of the organizational person in advancing the claim? Whose in-
terests are at stake, and are those interests weighty enough to 
mandate protection through the recognition of a right?
23
 Argua-
bly, the jurisprudential analysis should include references to 
the normative values implicated as well as discussion of wheth-
er a particular organizational person is an appropriate vehicle 
to advance or protect the asserted right.
24
 
 
 21. Compare CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE 
POSSIBILITY, DESIGN, AND STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS 1–16 (2011) (argu-
ing that corporations are moral agents but expressing skepticism about corpo-
rate rights), and Peter A. French, The Corporation As a Moral Person, 16 AM. 
PHIL. Q. 207, 207 (1979) (arguing that corporations are moral agents eligible 
for moral and legal rights), with Tom Donaldson, Moral Agency and Corpora-
tions, 10 PHIL. IN CONTEXT 54, 58–59 (1980) (arguing that corporations are 
moral agents but not moral persons and, as such, they can be held responsible 
for their acts but are not appropriate candidates for moral rights). Cf. ORTS, 
supra note 2, at 9 (“Whether and how to recognize business enterprises as or-
ganizational ‘entities’ and legal ‘persons’ that bear enforceable rights, privileg-
es, and responsibilities has been one of the most vexing issues in the history of 
legal thought.”). For a new collection of different views on the long-standing 
question of whether business firms have moral capacity, see THE MORAL 
RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS (Eric W. Orts & N. Craig Smith eds., forthcoming 
2015) (on file with author). 
 22. Compare H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN 
JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 162–93 (1982), and CARL WELLMAN, 
REAL RIGHTS (1995) (articulating will theories of rights, which identify as the 
central feature of a right the control it affords its bearer to insist upon perfor-
mance, or else release the corresponding duty-bearer), with Matthew H. Kra-
mer, Refining the Interest Theory of Rights, 55 AM. J. JURIS. 31, 31–34 (2010), 
and J. Raz, On the Nature of Rights, 93 MIND 194, 195 (1984) (proposing in-
terest theories of rights, according to which rights protect interests that are 
sufficiently important to impose corresponding duties upon others).  
 23. This paraphrases the conception of rights in Joseph Raz’s account. 
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 165–66 (1986); see also supra note 
22. 
 24.  This is the approach Anita Allen urges others to answer in concluding 
her analysis of corporate privacy rights. Allen, supra note 11, at 639 (arguing 
that “the question of corporate privacy rights must look for the most funda-
2284 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:2275 
 
Professor Pollman does not ask these questions. Instead, 
her analysis proceeds primarily from a doctrinal review of rele-
vant cases regarding the constitutional recognition of a “right 
to privacy.” She then argues that most of these cases do not 
support an extension to “most corporations in most circum-
stances.”
25
 Yet without first knowing what exactly is meant by 
“privacy,” and when and why corporations should enjoy rights, 
this methodology is too formalistic and removed from motivat-
ing principles that should otherwise drive one’s legal analysis.
26
 
An initial criticism that we have of Pollman’s method, then, is 
that she begins with cases rather than principles.
27
 Before one 
 
mental part of its answer in conceptual accounts of what we mean by ‘privacy’ 
and who or what may have moral and legal rights of their own”).  
 25.  Pollman, supra note 1, at 32, 44, 84, 88. 
 26.  It is worth noting that Pollman’s approach is especially problematic 
because case law often develops in light of instrumental litigation decisions, 
and not principled views about the way the law should be. Thus, Pollman 
places undue weight in her argument on the fact that litigants in federal court 
have not raised constitutional right to privacy claims on behalf of organiza-
tions in recent cases such as Federal Communications Commission v. AT&T, 
Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011), and ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). Pollman, supra note 1, at 27–28, 51 n.106, 81. But there are 
many reasons of strategy and tactics that may lead a litigant to omit making a 
constitutional claim. Some judges (or Justices), for example, may be expected 
to be averse to a constitutional privacy claim, and if a statutory claim is 
deemed stronger in practical terms it may be advanced and relied upon in-
stead. At least, it does not seem that a litigant’s decision to advance a legal 
argument or not should determine a normative question of what the law 
should be from an academic standpoint. 
 27.  Tellingly, Pollman’s references to the philosophical and jurispruden-
tial literature regarding the meaning of privacy do not occur until midway 
through her article. Pollman, supra note 1, at 59–62. Even once this literature 
is mentioned, moreover, Pollman gives it second billing: “Scholarly conceptions 
of privacy have added depth and context that aid in understanding the values 
or purpose being served in the Court’s privacy jurisprudence.” Id. at 59. With 
all due respect, this manner of proceeding gives too much credence to the Su-
preme Court as the ultimate arbiter of philosophical and legal principles. It is 
also possible—and we believe better—for scholars to inquire into first princi-
ples, especially when addressing a rapidly changing topic such as privacy in 
the digital age, and then consider how the Court’s precedents may square with 
these principles and advance our understanding of them in terms of legal 
precedents. We agree that one can also begin with an overview and analysis of 
cases, and then consider principles that they employ or seem to employ. But 
one should then subject these principles to a critical analysis in light of inde-
pendent normative considerations, and we do not believe that Pollman suffi-
ciently undertakes that analysis. 
  In this connection, the history of recognition of a “right to privacy” in 
the common law is revealing. No court followed the argument for such a right 
by Warren and Brandeis for many years, and yet William Prosser noted that 
by 1960 the legal world had changed. Many law review articles followed the 
original one, and the basic principle was adopted by legal decisions in almost 
all of the states. Prosser, supra note 18, at 384–90. Parsing the cases, Prosser 
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has a normative understanding of what one means by “priva-
cy,” and an account of the proper relationship between the cor-
poration and the individuals constituting and interacting with 
it, it does not make sense to proceed with an analysis of cases 
that invokes the principle.
28
  
Of course, Pollman’s methodology would not cause concern 
if the following two facts obtained: first, the case law adopted 
the correct normative and conceptual views of privacy and cor-
porate rights; and, second, Pollman distilled the right test from 
the case law she so comprehensively surveys. But there are 
 
identified four general categories of a “right to be let alone” that had become 
recognized in the common law: 
  1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his [or 
her] private affairs. 
  2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff. 
  3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. 
  4. Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name 
or likeness. 
Id. at 389. The point is that this development in the case law followed an 
emerging recognition of the importance of the ideas. 
  An interesting additional question that lies outside the scope of 
Pollman’s analysis is the extent to which organizational persons may assert 
the variations of common law rights of privacy identified by Prosser and oth-
ers. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 11, at 638–39. We leave this topic outside the 
scope of this Article too, but the very question adds another reason to suspect 
that adopting any preconception for or against organizational persons having 
rights of privacy is too hasty. 
 28.  Even following a doctrinal methodology, it appears that corporations 
(and other organizational persons) have often been recognized as having vari-
ous constitutional rights, at least some of which implicate considerations of 
“privacy.” See, e.g., ORTS, supra note 2, at 50 (“In U.S. constitutional law, the 
argument has been made that constitutional rights are meant to protect indi-
vidual people only—not organizational persons. This argument has not been 
persuasive over time, however, and constitutional rights for corporations (and 
other business firms) have been recognized in various areas, though not uni-
versally.”); Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc: Citizens United, McDonald, and the 
Future of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 910 (2011) 
(recounting various constitutional rights accorded to corporations). Further, at 
least in the Fourth Amendment context, the Court has recognized that busi-
ness corporations (and other firms) may assert privacy rights protecting 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. See, e.g., G. M. Leasing Corp. v. 
United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977) (“The respondents do not contend that 
business premises are not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Such a propo-
sition could not be defended in light of this Court’s clear holdings to the con-
trary. Nor can it be claimed that corporations are without some Fourth 
Amendment rights.”); see also Pollman, supra note 1, at 48 (citing Hale v. 
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906)). This history suggests that Pollman’s lengthy dis-
cussion of United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950), see Pollman, 
supra note 1, at 34–37, may be undue since that case is neither the first nor 
the final nor even the most forceful word on corporate constitutional privacy 
rights.    
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shortcomings along each of these dimensions. In the next Part, 
we identify conceptual issues with each of the notions of “corpo-
rations,” “rights,” and “privacy” in Pollman’s account.  
II.  CORPORATE PERSONHOOD, RIGHTS, AND PRIVACY   
We focus on two conceptual relationships: the relationship 
between corporations and rights in general, and the relation-
ship between corporate rights and privacy.
29
  
A. CORPORATIONS AND RIGHTS 
We will not rehearse the extensive literature debating 
whether corporations are persons.
30
 We begin instead with 
Pollman’s argument that corporate personhood is, effectively, a 
non-starter. Pollman contends that the doctrine of corporate 
personhood merely stands for the proposition that the corpora-
tion can bear some rights, but the doctrine neither provides a 
justification for ascribing rights to the corporation nor tells us 
which rights these are.
31
  
Pollman wisely cautions against an overly formalistic ap-
proach to corporate rights. On such an approach, individual 
rights are defined narrowly, and the corporation is then found 
ineligible for the right in question because it lacks the capaci-
ties that, on this analysis, ground the individual right. Thus, if 
rights of decisional privacy (which we discuss further below) 
are meant to protect only decisions around sex and procreation, 
we will have reason to deny that corporations, which can nei-
ther have sex nor procreate, should enjoy rights to decisional 
privacy.
32
 It is, of course, true by definition that a corporation 
 
 29.  In this Part and the next, we follow Pollman in restricting our analy-
sis to corporations. As we argue in Part V, however, we fail to see that there is 
something distinctive about corporations that warrants treating them apart 
from other organizations, both formal and informal—including social clubs, 
labor unions, partnerships, and so on. All of these groups raise vexing ques-
tions about whether and, if so, when and why they should enjoy and have the 
capacity to assert privacy rights. 
 30.  For an examination of the concept of “legal personality” as used to 
describe business firms, see ORTS, supra note 2, at 27–51. See also supra note 
20. For philosophical literature arguing that corporations are persons, see 
French, supra note 21, at 207, and Kendy M. Hess, The Free Will of Corpora-
tions (and Other Collectives), 168 PHIL. STUD. 241, 249 (2014).  
 31.  Pollman, supra note 1, at 50–51.  
 32.  Corporations can “merge” or subdivide by “spinning off,” but this is 
not quite the same thing as sex or reproduction!  
2015] PRIVACY AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERSONS 2287 
 
itself cannot hold a “purely personal” privacy right.
33
 Just as a 
corporation cannot be put in jail, it cannot get pregnant. But 
this observation does not end the argument. Corporations and 
other organizations are created for particular purposes—
business and otherwise—and these purposes may implicate 
personal privacy rights. 
Pollman does not argue against corporate rights of privacy 
by saying simply “corporations are not people, therefore they 
cannot have privacy rights.” However, her approach is never-
theless formalistic in other ways. As we have already noted, 
she takes the received legal doctrine at face value, without en-
gaging the critical normative question of whether the doctrine 
has gotten it right. Thus she contends that  
corporations do not receive rights because the characteristics of the 
entity so closely resemble a natural human so as to merit granting 
the right; rather corporations receive rights because, as forms of or-
ganizing human enterprise, they have natural persons involved in 
them, and sometimes it is necessary to accord protection to the corpo-
ration to protect their interests.
34
  
Here, Pollman neatly summarizes the history of judicial 
recognition of corporate rights. However, even if it were true 
that courts have never conferred original rights on a corpora-
tion to protect privacy, this would not mean that courts should 
not do so. Pollman therefore owes us an argument about why 
corporations cannot, or should not, enjoy rights originally. 
Suppose, though, that Pollman is correct as a normative 
matter that the only justification for conferring rights upon 
 
 33.  We understand the term “purely personal” here in the way that 
Pollman does, such that a “purely personal” right is a right “that inheres only 
in a natural person’s individual capacity.” Pollman, supra note 1, at 85–86.  
 34.  Id. at 52. There are possible exceptions to the rule that corporations 
are always composed of people that appear in corporate law. For example, the 
use of accounting entities or entities employed only imaginatively in mergers 
and acquisitions are arguably entities without actual people associated direct-
ly with them. See ORTS, supra note 2, at 36–40 (describing the use of entities 
in parent-subsidiary relationships, merger transactions, and changing busi-
ness forms). These examples might be described as “derivatives of derivatives,” 
but at some point grounding one’s analysis of what is happening in corporate 
law (and organizational law generally) always on individual people is too con-
voluted or otherwise does not make sense. See Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth 
Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 3) (on file with authors) (find-
ing that “the Court’s characterization of corporations as associations” does not 
adequately address the wide variety of current corporate organizations). We 
suggest that it becomes too complicated and unwieldy, for example, to try to 
track the interests of thousands of employees, managers, shareholders, credi-
tors, and other potentially relevant participants in large firms when answer-
ing particular kinds of questions in the law of organizations. 
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corporations is to protect the interests of the natural persons 
associated with the corporations. It still would not follow that 
corporations should not be accorded rights of their own in the 
first instance. To see this possibility, consider that there is an 
inherent ambiguity in the notion that corporations (or other or-
ganizations) may enjoy rights as a means of protecting the in-
terests of individuals. 
On one understanding, individual persons hold rights in 
the first instance. They come together for some joint endeavor, 
and the proper exercise of their rights requires that the corpo-
ration should also inherit or otherwise be recognized to enjoy 
the rights of these individual participants. This is the paradig-
matic case for what Pollman refers to as a “derivative” right.
35
 
Schematically, we can understand the right in the following 
way: 
Respecting an individual person’s right X requires ascrib-
ing right X to the corporation or other organization of which the 
individual person is a member. 
The recent Hobby Lobby case supplies an illustration.
36
 By 
the lights of the majority decision, and in the particular context 
of a closely held corporation founded on religious principles, to 
respect the corporate owners’ rights of religious freedom re-
quires that we ascribe a right of religious freedom to the corpo-
ration itself.
37
 Here, the right originates with the individual 
members of the corporation, and it is imputed to the corpora-
tion in order to give the individual right the full scope of its ex-
ercise.
38
 
 
 35.  Pollman, supra note 1, at 32, 53–54, 63–64; see also Blair & Pollman, 
supra note 34 (manuscript at 18–19, 21) (noting that the Court historically 
considered corporations to be associations with derivative rights).  
 36.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 37.  Id. at 2768 (“[P]rotecting the free-exercise rights of corporations like 
Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel protects the religious liberty of the hu-
mans who own and control those companies.”).  
 38.  One of us has argued that this is the most plausible way to under-
stand the right of religious freedom that Hobby Lobby recognized. Amy J. 
Sepinwall, Corporate Piety and Impropriety: Hobby Lobby’s Extension of RFRA 
Rights to the For Profit Corporation, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) 
(manuscript at 23), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2511666. For the 
view that Hobby Lobby recognized, and should have recognized, that the cor-
poration itself can practice religion in its own right (i.e., independent of 
whether any of its members share the corporation’s religious convictions), see 
Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. 
LAW. 1, 31 (2014) (“The Supreme Court was correct to conclude that Hobby 
Lobby and the other corporations are ‘persons’ capable of ‘exercising religion’ 
for purposes of the RFRA.”). 
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On a different understanding of what it would mean to ac-
cord rights to the corporation as a means of protecting individ-
uals’ interests, it is the corporation that enjoys the right in the 
first instance, but it enjoys the right in order to protect some 
rights or interests of the relevant individuals. Here, the indi-
viduals do not graft their rights onto the corporation. Instead, 
the right resides with the corporation itself, and it is the corpo-
ration that wields the right—deciding when and how to enforce 
it, or when to waive it—for itself. To be sure, at the end of the 
day, it is individual rights and interests that ground the corpo-
rate right. In this respect, it is correct to say that these corpo-
rate rights are “derivative,” just as rights that originate with 
individuals and are then grafted on to the corporation are “de-
rivative.” Both have as their ultimate rationale the protection 
or advancement of individual interests. Corporate rights on this 
second understanding, however, are not simply an extension of 
some individuals’ rights—they are ontologically distinct. The 
corporation has these rights as its own. 
Importantly, when a right resides in the first instance with 
the corporation or other organization, this right need not be the 
same as the individual right that the corporate right is de-
signed to protect. Schematically, then, we can understand this 
right as follows:  
 
  Moving from interpretation to justification, we co-authors have differ-
ent views about the final result in Hobby Lobby. One of us sees this interest as 
justified in the context of a small business firm such as Hobby Lobby (and its 
companion plaintiff, Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation), given that 
business owners are the most appropriate members or participants in the firm 
to ground the right. Amy J. Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity: Assessing 
Pleas for Religious Exemptions in Hobby Lobby’s Wake, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 10–11), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2496218; Sepinwall, Corporate Piety, supra (manu-
script at 33–36) (arguing that the individuals whose interests should count are 
those whom we would think it appropriate to blame when the corporation 
commits a wrong or praise when the corporation succeeds, as these individuals 
have a special claim on having the corporation act in ways that conform to 
their conscience). The other takes the view that a proper construction of the 
nature of the firm in cases such as Hobby Lobby should recognize the rights of 
employees as well as owners and managers as important to protect. On this 
view, Hobby Lobby is wrongly decided because it sacrifices the religious and 
other fundamental rights and interests of the firm’s employees in favor of op-
posing rights and interest of the managers and owners. Eric W. Orts, Theoriz-
ing the Firm: Social Ontology in the Supreme Court, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. (forth-
coming 2015) (manuscript at 30–38); Eric Orts, Undertheorizing the 
Corporation Continued: Hobby Lobby and Employees’ Rights, CONGLOMERATE 
(July 16, 2014), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2014/07/undertheorizing-the 
-corporation-continued-hobby-lobby-and-employees-rights.html. 
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Respecting an individual person’s right X (or interest in X) 
requires according right X or some other right Y to the corpora-
tion or other organization. 
The Citizens United case can be understood along these 
lines.
39
 Individuals’ interests in hearing corporate views for 
purposes of gathering information about candidates for political 
office grounds the corporation’s right to free speech, at least ac-
cording to one persuasive argument adopted by the Court.
40
 On 
this view, listeners’ rights are one kind of speech right.
41
 The 
corporation in these situations enjoys a right of the same kind 
as the right of the individuals whom the corporate right pro-
tects. But the corporate right is not just an extension of the in-
dividual listeners’ rights. Once the corporation enjoys the right 
of political speech, it can determine, according to its own inter-
nal governance structure, whether and how to exercise that 
right. In other words, the corporation has a right to speak in 
order to protect citizens’ right to listen. 
 
 39.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 40.  Id. at 356 (“When Government seeks to use its full power, including 
the criminal law, to command where a person may get his or her information 
or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, it uses censorship to control 
thought. This is unlawful. The First Amendment confirms the freedom to 
think for ourselves.”); see also ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 66–76 (2014).   
 41.  For examples of scholarly analysis focused on listeners’ rights or in-
terests in various free-speech contexts, see Michael I. Meyerson, The Right To 
Speak, the Right To Hear, and the Right Not To Hear: The Technological Reso-
lution to the Cable/Pornography Debate, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 137 (1987–
88) (arguing that government censorship is improper where cable subscribers 
are able to block offensive channels in a way that does not interfere with the 
ability of others to view the channels); Laurent Sacharoff, Listener Interests in 
Compelled Speech Cases, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 329 (2008) (arguing that the 
Court has wrongly relied on protecting “the speaker’s freedom of mind” as a 
justification for the compelled speech doctrine, and that it should base the doc-
trine instead on “listener interests”); Note, Overbreadth and Listeners’ Rights, 
123 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (2010) (proposing that the ability of third parties to 
“challenge overbroad statutes in the First Amendment context” is best ex-
plained by those parties’ rights to listen rather than to speak); cf. Daniel J. 
Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1688–89 (2009) (arguing that a “speaker-based model 
dominates First Amendment jurisprudence,” but recognizing that “the rights 
of listeners” are given weight in some circumstances). For an earlier argument 
for focusing on listeners’ rights in the corporate speech context, see EDWIN P. 
ROME & WILLIAM H. ROBERTS, CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL FREE SPEECH: 
FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF EXPRESSION IN BUSINESS 201–04 (1985) 
(discussing the impact Alexander Meiklejohn’s focus on the rights of listeners 
has had on modern interpretation of the First Amendment).  
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In a different category of cases, the corporate right can dif-
fer from the individual right.
42
 Consider, for example, that 
newspaper and media companies currently enjoy privacy 
rights, such as when a newspaper refuses to disclose the identi-
ty of a confidential source.
43
 The right here is arguably ground-
ed neither in the privacy interests of the confidential source nor 
in the free speech rights of the newspaper itself (or its report-
ers), but instead in the interests the general electorate has in a 
free press.
44
 Here, then, the corporate right is different in kind 
from the individual right that the corporate right protects: 
again, the corporation’s right is a right of privacy, and the indi-
viduals’ right is a right to a free press. Further, the interests 
the corporation’s right protects are those of citizens, but the 
right itself belongs to the news corporation in the first instance. 
Moreover, there may be other cases of corporate rights that 
are not grounded in any rights of the individuals with whom 
the corporation interacts. For example, we may want our home 
institution of the University of Pennsylvania (Penn) to engage 
in fundraising because we want Penn to have certain resources 
from which we can benefit as professors. But we have neither a 
right to these resources nor control over the way Penn fund-
raises, and we certainly do not have a right to insist that Penn 
must fundraise on our behalf. Still, if one wanted to know why 
Penn had a right to fundraise, one would point ultimately to 
the interests of individuals such as professors (as well as stu-
dents, alumni, and perhaps society in general) whom Penn’s 
fundraising serves. 
In short, we believe that there are two kinds of corporate 
rights: (1) rights that reside with the corporation in the first in-
 
 42.  Following Pollman’s focus on corporations, we refer here sometimes to 
“corporate rights,” but as we discuss in Part IV the question involves “organi-
zational rights” in general. In other words, we sometimes use “corporate 
rights” generically to mean “organizational rights.”  
 43.  See RonNell Andersen Jones, Rethinking Reporter’s Privilege, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 1221 (2013) (reviewing the development of law in this area fo-
cusing on the privilege held by reporters and recommending an alternative 
focused on the rights of anonymous sources); Geoffrey R. Stone, Secrecy and 
Self-Governance, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 81 (2011–12) (examining the problem 
of confidential sources in terms of the rights of public employees and the rights 
of “the press”). A high-profile case recently involved The New York Times and 
its refusal to force its reporter, James Risen, to provide details about a confi-
dential source regarding a clandestine intelligence operation conducted by the 
United States against Iran. Matt Apuzzo, Seven Years in, Reporter Says Little 
to Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2015, at A1.  
 44.  Cf. RAZ, supra note 23, at 253–54 (describing the special privileges of 
the press and asserting that the “justification of the special rights and privi-
leges of the press are in its service to the community at large”). 
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stance and (2) rights that originate with individuals and are 
then ascribed to the corporation. Note that both kinds of rights 
derive from the rights or interests of individual people insofar 
as each kind of right has as its rationale the protection of indi-
vidual rights or interests. As such, we think the term “deriva-
tive right” is unhelpfully ambiguous. It is more perspicuous to 
classify corporate rights according to who holds them in the 
first instance. Accordingly, we will distinguish between prima-
ry and secondary corporate rights. Primary rights are those 
held by the corporation (or other organizational person) in the 
first instance—e.g., rights of political speech in Citizens United. 
Secondary rights are those the corporation inherits from the 
rights of some individuals—e.g., rights of religious freedom in 
Hobby Lobby.
45
 
 
 45.  Our distinction between primary and secondary rights tracks Meir 
Dan-Cohen’s distinction between original and derivative rights. See MEIR 
DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 58–60 (1986) (“A may 
have a right because of either of two reasons. A right may be recognized in A 
out of concern for A himself. In such a case, A has an original right. A right in 
A may also result from a concern not for him but for B. In this case, A will be 
said to have a derivative right.”). Dan-Cohen’s conception of derivative rights 
does not involve the ambiguity inherent in Pollman’s use of that term. We 
might otherwise have used Dan-Cohen’s terminology, but it will be useful to 
depart from it here, in order to avoid confusion.  
  In the First Amendment context, Robert Post has also distinguished 
between original and derivative rights. See POST, supra note 40, at 70–74. On 
Post’s account, commercial for-profit corporations do not have original rights 
to participate in political speech because only those who can “experience the 
subjective good of democratic legitimation” have those rights originally, and 
corporations cannot “experience the subjective good of democratic legitima-
tion.” Id. at 71. Corporations “instead possess the derivative First Amendment 
right to speak in ways that inform auditors who are strangers to the corpora-
tion.” Id. at 71–72. We may agree with Post that the corporation does not have 
the kind of interests or status that would ground its having free speech rights 
of its own accord. (As one of us has written elsewhere, corporations are not the 
kind of citizens that are expected to participate in the political or civic life of 
the nation-state. See Amy J. Sepinwall, Citizens United and the Ineluctable 
Question of Corporate Citizenship, 44 CONN. L. REV. 575 (2012).) But Post’s 
notion of derivative rights seems to conflate, or at least to elide, our distinction 
between primary and secondary rights. In the free speech context, Post con-
tends that the corporation’s rights are rooted only in the interests of 
“strangers to the corporation.” POST, supra note 40, at 70. This would suggest 
that corporate free speech rights are always secondary rights; further, the only 
interests grounding those rights are interests of individuals outside of the cor-
poration. This seems to us to unnecessarily circumscribe the scope and kind of 
corporate free speech rights, because it grounds the rights exclusively in the 
interests of listeners. By contrast, we allow that individuals within the corpo-
ration might have an interest in having the corporation speak on their behalf, 
and that interest might warrant constitutional protection. This is obviously 
the way to think about the free speech rights of unions and advocacy groups. 
But commercial corporations might enjoy speaker-based free speech rights too. 
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With secondary rights, the corporation’s right will always 
mirror the same right of the individuals from which the corpo-
rate right originates. For example, a secondary right to corpo-
rate privacy would flow from individuals’ rights of privacy. Sim-
ilarly, a secondary right to corporate religious freedom would 
flow from individuals’ rights of religious freedom.
46
 
By contrast, although primary rights are also intended to 
protect individuals’ interests, and even sometimes individuals’ 
rights, the corporate primary right need not be identical to the 
right of the individuals that the corporate right is designed to 
protect. As such, corporate primary rights are unlike Pollman’s 
derivative rights or her instrumental rights. For example, as 
we argue below, corporations might enjoy rights to privacy to 
protect individuals’ property rights, rights of freedom of associ-
ation, or the corporation’s own intellectual property.
47
  
We do not seek to articulate a full-blown account of prima-
ry corporate constitutional rights here, but it is useful to sketch 
what such an account might look like. Primary corporate 
rights, as we conceive of them, embody elements of the two 
prominent theories of the grounds of rights: the will theory and 
 
Consider, for example, Google’s speech in favor of legalizing gay marriage, 
which it undertakes on behalf of its employees in homosexual marriages 
whose mobility is limited if there are states, or countries, that will not recog-
nize homosexual marriages and so deny the employees’ partner’s spousal bene-
fits. See, e.g., Alexander C. Kaufman, Here Are The 379 Companies Urging the 
Supreme Court To Support Same-Sex Marriage, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 5, 
2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/05/marriage-equality-amicus_ 
n_6808260.html (listing Googe as among 379 signatories of an amicus brief in 
Obergefell v. Hodges, the pending Supreme Court case raising the issue of 
whether the Fourteenth Amendment compels states to recognize same-sex 
marriage); Chris Matyszczyk, Google to Governments: Legalize Gay Love, 
CNET (July 8, 2012), http://www.cnet.com/news/google-to-governments-
legalize-gay-love. Google’s right to speak is grounded in the interests (and 
perhaps also the equality rights) of its employees, not in those of “strangers” to 
the corporation. Further, the right is one of speech, not one of hearing. Alt-
hough it is important that governments and citizens get to hear what Google 
has to say, it is at least as important that Google be permitted to advocate on 
behalf of its employees (not to mention others, such as customers). For these 
reasons, Google’s right is properly understood as a primary right. But Post’s 
account appears not to have the resources to accommodate a right so under-
stood, since rights grounded in individual interests appear on his account, at 
least in the free speech context, to track only the interests of listeners, and not 
those on behalf of whom the corporation might speak. With that said, it is not 
clear what Post’s analysis portends for other corporate constitutional rights 
and so we do not consider it further here. 
 46.  See infra text accompanying notes 52–53 (describing the constraints 
on corporate religious exercise where the corporation’s right of religious free-
dom is a secondary right). 
 47.  See infra Part III.B. 
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the interest theory. According to the will theory, the defining 
feature of a right is the choice it gives the right-holder over its 
disposition.
48
 In particular, rights, on this view, confer upon 
those who possess them the choice whether to enforce or waive 
the privileges or duties that correlate with the rights in ques-
tion. Thus, the will theory primarily illuminates what it means 
for someone to have a right. The interest theory, by contrast, 
elucidates why it is that someone would have a right.
49
 Thus, on 
Joseph Raz’s paradigmatic statement of the view, ‘“X has a 
right’ if and only if X can have rights, and, other things being 
equal, an aspect of X’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient 
reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty.”
50
 
Using our nomenclature in this context, we suggest that 
with primary organizational rights a corporation or other or-
ganizational person exercises control over the assertion or 
waiver of the right. In accordance with a will theory of rights, 
the organization and its governing authority determine when 
and how the organization will assert its primary rights.
51
 In 
 
 48.  See, e.g., HART, supra note 22; WELLMAN, supra note 22.  
 49.  This perhaps overstates the distinction between what it means to 
have a right and why we accord rights, but we think it helpful to cast the two 
accounts in this way to see that they might complement each other, especially 
where, as here, the bearer of the right is comprised of many individual right-
holders. For theorists who advance hybrid will-interest theories, see, for ex-
ample, Gopal Sreenivasan, A Hybrid Theory of Claim-Rights, 25 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 257 (2005); and Rowan Cruft, Rights: Beyond Interest Theory and 
Will Theory?, 23 LAW & PHIL. 347 (2004). 
 50.  RAZ, supra note 23, at 166 (emphasis added). The interests worthy of 
protection are those “goods whose satisfaction is required for a recognizably 
human life, whatever a person’s particular plans, and distinctive conceptions 
of the good.” Sarah Hannan, Autonomy, Well-being, and Children’s Rights: A 
Hybrid Account (working paper, Stanford University) (Feb. 10, 2012).  
  Although we borrow Raz’s justification for why anyone has rights, we 
do not adopt his justification for corporate rights in particular, which is frus-
tratingly brief: “There is little that needs to be said here of the capacity of cor-
porations and other ‘artificial’ persons to have rights. Whatever explains and 
accounts for the existence of such persons,” says Raz, “also accounts for their 
capacity to have rights.” RAZ, supra note 23, at 176. One way to capture what 
is at stake for us, as well as Pollman, is an effort to get clear on just what fea-
tures or considerations do explain the existence of organizational persons. 
 51.  One might worry that the notion of a corporation deciding of its own 
accord relies on the controversial proposition that the corporation can form 
and act on intentions of its own—that it has its own mind, if you will. The 
worry might be especially keenly felt by those who think of the corporation as 
nothing more than a nexus of contracts, see, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & 
Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1426 
(1989); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Mana-
gerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 
310 (1976), or who otherwise adopt a reductionist conception of the corporation 
and so also deny that the corporation consists of anyone other than its indi-
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contrast, with secondary organizational rights, we refer to situ-
ations in which the individual people with whom the right orig-
inates retain greater control over the exercise of the corporate 
analog of the right. In these situations, we expect the exercise 
of organizational rights to be more closely tied to the ways in 
which these individuals would use the rights. For example, 
while Hobby Lobby enjoys a right of religious freedom (at least 
now according to the Supreme Court),
52
 that right must still 
track the interests generating it. The company cannot now as-
sert rights as a Muslim or Buddhist corporation, at least while 
its owners retain their current Christian faith. Instead, given 
the rationale for Hobby Lobby’s right, that right should be  
exercised in accordance with the owners’ religious convictions. 
By contrast, because the right of political speech under Citizens 
United is a primary right, the content of the speech in which 
the corporation engages need not track the interests of any par-
ticular set of listeners. The corporation enjoys organizational 
autonomy in determining just what it will say.
53
  
 
vidual members, see, e.g., BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, 
CRIME AND ACCOUNTABILITY 19 (1993) (quoting Friedrich Hayek as a propo-
nent of reductionism or methodological individualism—i.e., the view that 
“[t]here is no other way toward an understanding of social phenomena but 
through our understanding of individual actions directed toward other people 
and guided by their expected behavior.”). See also Amy J. Sepinwall, Guilty by 
Proxy: Expanding the Boundaries of Responsibility in the Face of Corporate 
Crime, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 411, 422 n.43 (2012) (collecting sources espousing a 
reductionist position on corporations). It is beyond the scope of this Article to 
elaborate a theory of corporate intentionality that would completely quiet the 
concern that we are operating with a metaphysically loaded conception of the 
corporation. We note, however, that there are accounts of shared intentions 
that do not require the positing of a group mind or a metaphysically “real” ex-
istence of corporations outside of society. See, e.g., Michael Bratman, Shared 
Intention, 104 ETHICS 97 (1993); Margaret Gilbert, Shared Intention and Per-
sonal Intentions, 144 PHIL. STUD. 167 (2009). For these purposes anyway, we 
align ourselves with the general idea contained in these accounts. Cf. ORTS, 
supra note 2, at 14–19, 38 (advancing an “institutional theory” that posits a 
social ontology of business firms without an abstract metaphysics regarding 
“real entities”).  
 52.  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 53. Again, note that the idea of primary organizational rights articulated 
here does not turn on some mysterious metaphysical conception of the corpo-
ration or other organizational persons. Exercising rights may count as just one 
among the many mundane ways that corporations and other organizational 
persons act in the world: buying property, entering contracts, marketing prod-
ucts, and so on. See, e.g., ORTS, supra note 2, at 27–105 (describing the struc-
ture of “business persons” to act in these ways); cf. Hess, supra note 30, at 249 
(contending that the corporation’s reliance on its “physical base” (i.e., its indi-
vidual members) to carry out its actions is no different from our relying on our 
“physical base” (i.e., our bodies) to carry out our actions). 
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B. CORPORATE RIGHTS AND PRIVACY 
Our efforts to articulate a distinction between primary and 
secondary corporate rights, and to fault Pollman for overlook-
ing that distinction, is not mere pedantry. The distinction re-
veals a flaw in the test that Pollman develops for determining 
whether to grant a corporation a particular constitutional right. 
Pollman describes her test as an effort to “analyze[] the 
corporate dynamics and participants involved in the type of 
corporation—public, private or nonprofit—to determine wheth-
er any people likely have a privacy interest at stake and wheth-
er the purpose of the privacy right would be served by deriva-
tively according it to the corporation.”
54
 In other words, for 
 
 54. Pollman, supra note 1, at 63–64 (emphasis added); see also id. at 33 
(“[T]he analysis looks to whether a corporate right to privacy would protect the 
privacy interests of the people involved, such as shareholders, directors, and 
officers, or other participants such as employees.”). Earlier in her contribution, 
Pollman offers a description of the test as it would apply to corporate rights 
generically:  
[T]his Article asserts that in determining whether to accord a right to 
a corporation, we must look to whether the purpose of the right is 
served by according it to the corporation in question—that is, whether 
it is necessary to protect natural persons—and if the right is of a type 
that inheres only in an individual in his or her individual capacity. 
Id. at 54; see also Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 
2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1675 (“Courts should grant corporations a particular 
constitutional right only when doing so would serve the purpose of that 
right.”). The problem is the same, however: In seeking to determine whether 
the corporation should enjoy some right, we are to look only to the individual 
counterpart to that right. In this way, Pollman never considers the fact that 
other individual rights, or individual interests not backed by rights, might be 
served by granting the corporation the right in question. 
  Pollman draws this test not only from the doctrinal excavation she 
undertakes in A Corporate Right to Privacy but also from another article she 
wrote with Margaret Blair which offers a more general analysis of corporate 
constitutional rights. See Blair & Pollman, supra note 34. Notably, the test 
they articulate is compatible with either primary or secondary organizational 
rights, as we conceive of them. See id. (manuscript at 52) (identifying as “the 
correct question” an “incremental” inquiry into “whether extending a particu-
lar right to a corporation protects the rights of actual people and serves the 
purpose of the constitutional provision at issue”). Other theorists whom 
Pollman cites in support of her work seem also to allow that the corporation 
might enjoy rights different from those of the individuals whom the corporate 
rights are intended to protect. For example, she favorably quotes Meir Dan-
Cohen for the proposition that “a derivative right serves ‘to safeguard or en-
hance the enjoyment of certain rights by others.’” Pollman, supra note 1, at 52 
n.107 (quoting Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory of 
Protected Communications by Organizations, Communities, and the State, 79 
CALIF. L. REV. 1229, 1246 (1991)). But on Dan-Cohen’s view, unlike Pollman’s, 
one party might enjoy a right in order to protect the same right or other rights 
(or interests) held by others. See Dan-Cohen, supra at 1233 (“A right may be 
recognized in A out of concern for A himself. In such a case, A has what I shall 
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Pollman, rights of privacy are invariably personal to individu-
als, and corporations (and other organizational persons) can 
therefore meaningfully assert them, if at all, only “derivatively” 
on behalf of their individual members or “instrumentally” to 
serve the interests of individuals whom the corporation affects. 
To put the point in the terminology developed here, all corpo-
rate or organizational rights, for Pollman, are secondary 
rights.
55
 
There are two problems with a test that limits corporate 
constitutional rights in this way. First, the test does not in fact 
track the case law from which it is supposedly distilled. Second, 
Pollman’s test leads to results that are not only in tension with 
the law but also less justifiable from a normative perspective. 
We elaborate on each problem in turn. 
1. Doctrinal Departures 
Pollman’s test, in both its generic form and with regard to 
privacy rights in particular, is narrower than what the case law 
mandates. Outside of the privacy context, the Supreme Court 
has recognized corporate constitutional rights where the corpo-
rate right is not the same as the individual right the former 
seeks to protect. Thus, for example, in Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, an incorporated Catholic organization claimed that an Or-
egon law requiring compulsory public school education uncon-
stitutionally interfered with its activities, which included 
operating religious schools.
56
 The Court recognized that the law 
impermissibly abridged the Society’s substantive constitutional 
rights by undercutting their legitimate business activities and 
private property guarantees.
57
 The Court acknowledged that 
businesses typically cannot complain when their revenues are 
 
call an original right. A right in A may also result from a concern not for him 
but for B. In this case, A will be said to have a derivative right. A guardian, for 
example, may be given such rights as are necessary for the effective execution 
of her role. She may, for instance, have a right to reimbursement for expenses 
incurred in carrying out her duties. However, the reason for the right to reim-
bursement lies in the concern for the ward’s interests, and only derivatively in 
the concern for protecting the guardian’s interests.”). 
 55.  Jerry Kang appears to adopt a similar position. He writes: “A corpo-
ration qua corporation does not [have privacy rights]. Only the individuals 
that make up the corporation do. This does not mean that the corporation 
must lack standing to argue the privacy interests of its constituent individual 
members. It does mean, however, that the foundation of any such group priva-
cy claim lies originally in the interests of individual human beings.” Jerry 
Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 
1210 (1998). 
 56.  268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 57.  Id. at 535–36. 
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reduced because of legitimate state regulation, but then argued 
that the regulation here was not legitimate because it inter-
fered with parents’ liberty interests in deciding on the kind of 
education they want for their children.
58
 Pierce, then, presents 
a case where the corporation’s constitutional rights to property 
are recognized as a means of protecting the distinct liberty in-
terests of the corporation’s “patrons,” namely, the parents and 
children whom the religious and educational corporation 
serves.
59
 
Further, for privacy rights in particular, the Court has not 
insisted that the corporate right obtains only where individuals’ 
privacy interests are at stake: other individual interests or 
rights can suffice. Consider NAACP v. Alabama, a case in 
which the NAACP asserted a right to privacy in response to a 
governmental order that the NAACP furnish the names of its 
members.
60
 The Court recognized the NAACP’s privacy right in 
the form of what we would call a primary organizational right. 
The Court grounded the NAACP’s right not only in the privacy 
rights of the NAACP’s members (who, for fear of reprisals, had 
a legitimate interest in not being identified) but also in their 
rights of freedom of association.
61
 Thus two sets of individual 
rights grounded the organizational privacy right recognized in 
NAACP: individual rights to privacy and individual rights to 
freedom of association.
62
 The case demonstrates that a corpora-
tion can be accorded one right—here an organizational right to 
privacy—in order to protect a different right of the individuals 
involved with it—here a right to freedom of association.
63
 And 
indeed while the NAACP members, in light of the reprisal 
threats, had compelling privacy interests at stake, other cases 
 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  For an influential account of nonprofit organizations in terms of their 
“patrons,” see Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE 
L.J. 835 (1980). 
 60. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
 61. Id. at 462. 
 62. In the Court’s words: “We hold that the immunity from state scrutiny 
of membership lists which the Association claims on behalf of its members is 
here so related to the right of the members to pursue their lawful private in-
terests privately and to associate freely with others in so doing as to come 
within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 466. 
 63.  Again to quote the Court: “Inviolability of privacy in group association 
may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of as-
sociation, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.” Id. at 462.  
Pollman sees that rights of privacy can become “enmeshed” with “the freedom 
to associate and other rights.”  Pollman, supra note 1, at 82 (discussing 
NAACP).  She does not suggest as we do, however, that an organizational 
right of privacy might be invoked in the service of a right of association. 
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demonstrate that the organization’s privacy interests might be 
grounded solely in their members’ associational rights, with no 
need to advert to the members’ interests in remaining anony-
mous.
64
  
In sum, Pollman maintains that the test to be distilled 
from the doctrine is one that seeks to determine whether some 
individual right should be ascribed to the corporation, but the 
existing doctrine is in fact more capacious, as it allows for the 
corporation to enjoy rights of its own, just so long as those 
rights ultimately serve individual rights or interests. The cur-
rent doctrine as expressed in some leading precedents is more 
expansive in its recognition of organizational rights than the 
test Pollman adduces.  
2. Unduly Narrow Framing 
The constrained nature of Pollman’s test gives rise to some 
unconvincing results. For example, in discussing whether we 
should recognize a right of privacy in the large, publicly traded 
corporation, Pollman examines the interests of the corpora-
tion’s various participants. But she looks only to the privacy in-
terests of these participants, not to other interests they might 
have. Thus, for example, she argues that the privacy rights of 
shareholders are not implicated in the corporation’s activities 
because shareholders do not provide sensitive information to 
the corporation.
65
 But shareholders might have other interests, 
and even rights, that would be sufficient to ground a right of 
privacy in the corporation. For example, Yahoo! might have 
privacy rights that protect it from needing to turn over infor-
mation identifying users to the government, and these rights 
might be grounded not in its users’ privacy rights nor in any 
 
 64.  See, e.g., United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 306 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(“[T]he nature and purposes of the corporate entity and the nature of the inter-
est sought to be protected will determine the question whether under given 
facts the corporation per se has a protectable privacy interest.” (emphasis add-
ed)); Colegio Puertorriqueno De Ninas, Liceo Ponceno, Inc. v. Pesquera De 
Busquets, 464 F. Supp. 761, 766 (D.P.R. 1979) (collecting cases recognizing the 
right to privacy of collective entities and explaining that “[i]n each of these de-
cisions, the right of privacy operated as a ban on the challenged actions only 
by reason of its being intimately connected to some [other] fundamental con-
stitutional guarantee” held by the entity’s members—for example, rights to 
freedom of expression or procedural due process). 
 65.  Pollman, supra note 1, at 66 (“[A]s far as information flows, because 
shareholders are not active participants in the business, they typically do not 
provide or create information in their limited involvement that would impli-
cate privacy interests.”); see also id. at 64–67 (arguing generally that share-
holders’ interests and rights will only rarely support a corporate privacy 
right).  
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rights of any other business participants. Instead, Yahoo!’s pri-
vacy rights might be justified by the interests of individual 
shareholders as follows: Shareholders want Yahoo! to succeed 
financially, Yahoo! will succeed if it is a site users want to fre-
quent, and users will not want to frequent a site that discloses 
confidential information about them.
66
 On this rationale, Ya-
hoo! would enjoy a privacy right because it is in the sharehold-
ers’ financial interests that it have this right. And Yahoo!’s 
right would have nothing to do with its shareholders’ interest 
in keeping their own information private. 
Pollman’s narrow understanding of the test for corporate 
rights might also explain why she fails to find corporate deci-
sional privacy rights. Pollman admirably surveys the scholar-
ship on privacy, which recognizes both informational and deci-
sional privacy, and she helpfully traces both kinds of privacy 
through their doctrinal development.
67
 In applying her test, 
however, she contemplates only whether individuals’ rights to 
informational privacy would justify a corporate privacy right; 
concerns for corporate decisional privacy fall out of the picture 
almost entirely.
68
 
Presumably, the omission is deliberate. Again, Pollman be-
lieves that a corporation should have right X only if according 
right X is necessary for the protection of individuals’ right X. 
So, on her account, the corporation would have a right to deci-
 
 66.  A well-known teaching case in business ethics concerns a request 
from the Chinese government to Yahoo! to turn over information about users 
in order to proceed criminally. The freedom of speech of the user would be pro-
tected under many other national laws, putting Yahoo! in an ethical and legal 
bind. See SANDRA J. SUCHER & DANIEL BAER, YAHOO! IN CHINA (A) (Harvard 
Business School rev. 2011). We do not mean to suggest, by the way, that cor-
porate privacy rights should be broadly recognized any time that it would be in 
the shareholders’ interests. Scenarios implicating shareholders’ interests, 
however, may often motivate a corporation to claim such rights.   
  With respect to understanding the economic interests and rights of 
participants in business corporations, we also do not believe that an analysis 
should be limited only to the interests and rights of shareholders. The board 
and managers of corporations answer to a broader constituency of interests 
that compose the firm. See, e.g., ORTS, supra note 2, at 53–108, 223–30, 254–
55.  
 67.  We describe these different kinds or meanings of privacy, including 
decisional and informational privacy, in Part III below. 
 68.  Pollman considers decisional privacy rights at only one point in her 
analysis—in thinking about the rights of shareholders of the non-profit or pri-
vate corporation. Pollman, supra note 1, at 78–79. She contends that “[t]he 
role of shareholders in private corporations is economic and not likely to impli-
cate decisional autonomy,” id., and then moves on. She never makes clear why 
she does not consider decisional privacy rights in the context of publicly traded 
corporations or for the sake of constituents other than shareholders. 
2015] PRIVACY AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERSONS 2301 
 
sional privacy only if according it a right to decisional privacy 
was necessary for protecting individuals’ rights to decisional 
privacy. But one might think that protecting decisional privacy 
rights would never require that these rights be grafted on to 
the corporation. After all, to have a decisional privacy right is 
to have the capacity to make certain important decisions by 
and for oneself. In this way, decisional privacy rights are non-
delegable; we cannot graft them on to the corporation as an ex-
tension of the individual right since no such extension is con-
ceptually possible. It would be paradoxical then to posit corpo-
rate decisional privacy rights—at least if one believes, as 
Pollman apparently does, that all corporate rights are second-
ary rights. 
We do not know if the foregoing argument is in fact the one 
Pollman had in mind when she largely abandoned decisional 
privacy in her analysis, but it is consistent with her narrow 
understanding of the ground of corporate rights. There are, 
however, two problems with her understanding. First, the no-
tion of organizational decisional privacy rights is not in fact 
conceptually impossible or even far-fetched. It seems instead 
that some paradigmatic individual decisional privacy rights can 
receive their full effect only with the participation of others—
individuals and organizations. For example, a right to abortion 
would be an empty formality if doctors and organizations (e.g., 
hospitals or clinics) were not permitted the liberty to offer and 
participate in abortion procedures. It seems necessary, then, for 
hospitals or clinics to possess decisional privacy rights (i.e., 
rights to decide whether they will include pregnancy termina-
tion among their services) in order to protect a woman’s right to 
choose. And the fact that the hospital or clinic’s right is a deci-
sional right is important because we think that hospitals or 
clinics should also be free to refuse to provide abortion ser-
vices.
69
 Similarly, and as we argue at greater length in the next 
Part, abortion and other reproductive rights might require as 
well the support of advocacy organizations like Planned 
Parenthood. These organizations also assert decisional rights to 
act in the world to advance the rights and interests of their 
beneficiaries.
70
  
 
 69.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Sepper, Taking Conscience Seriously, 98 VA. L. 
REV. 1501 (2012) (recognizing conscience rights that protect individuals’ and 
organizations’ rights to participate or else refuse to participate in the provision 
of abortion). 
 70.  Planned Parenthood regularly brings lawsuits claiming to protect the 
constitutional rights of individual women under the Roe v. Wade line of cases. 
See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 320 
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More significantly, we could ground primary rights to or-
ganizational decisional privacy if we were to adopt a test 
broader than Pollman’s—a test, for example, that allowed a 
corporation to assert right X to serve the interests or rights Y of 
some individuals. To be sure, the contexts in which the Su-
preme Court has explicitly recognized a right to decisional pri-
vacy have little relevance for the corporation. These cases 
largely concern rights around sex, medical treatment, and child 
rearing.
71
 But the principled ground of the decisions in which 
these rights were secured has application beyond the specific 
acts to which the rights were applied. In particular, the rele-
vant cases grounded decisional privacy in the values of auton-
omy or self-determination, and these values can be extended to 
organizational autonomy and self-determination as well.
72
 
 
(2006) (addressing a challenge brought by several abortion clinics seeking a 
declaratory injunction against a New Hampshire law requiring parental noti-
fication at least forty-eight hours prior to performing an abortion on a minor 
on the ground that the law did not explicitly permit physicians to perform 
emergency abortions when continued pregnancy threatened the minor’s 
health); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 833 (1992) (ad-
dressing a challenge brought by five abortion clinics and one physician, on be-
half of himself and other physicians providing abortion services, seeking a de-
claratory injunction against Pennsylvania law impeding access to abortion on 
demand). 
 71.  See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also In re Quinlan, 355 
A.2d 647, 647 (N.J. 1976) (addressing the right to privacy under the U.S. and 
New Jersey Constitutions regarding a decision to withdraw life-sustaining 
treatment). In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized a right to be free of 
unwanted bodily invasions for purposes of evidence gathering, which sound in 
both decisional and informational privacy. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 
U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (“Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the 
struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction 
of his stomach’s contents . . . is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities.”); 
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985) (“A compelled surgical intrusion into 
an individual’s body for evidence . . . implicates expectations of privacy and 
security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be ‘unreasonable’ even if 
likely to produce evidence of a crime.”). 
 72.  See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 
476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986) (“Few decisions are more personal and intimate, 
more properly private, or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than 
a woman’s decision . . . whether to end her pregnancy.”); Anita L. Allen, Tak-
ing Liberties: Privacy, Private Choice, and Social Contract Theory, 56 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 461, 462 (1987) (“The exercise of privacy-promoting liberties . . . can 
foster traits and conditions feminists have long deemed paramount, including 
self-determination, participation as equals, and social contribution on a par 
with innate capacities.”); Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal 
Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2056, 2058 (2003) (“The focus of decisional privacy is 
on freedom from interference when one makes certain fundamental decisions  
. . . .”).  
  From a philosophical perspective, “privacy” may often serve as a 
placeholder for other values, such as “autonomy” or “self-determination.” See 
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Thus, in our view, corporations and other organizational per-
sons should be seen to enjoy rights that protect a degree of au-
tonomous decision-making and self-governance, which is cap-
tured by the notion of corporate decisional privacy rights.  
To illustrate our argument, imagine that the executives of 
a business corporation decide that it would be in the corpora-
tion’s financial interest to close American factories and set up 
factories overseas where labor is cheaper. Not wanting to lose 
their jobs, the American factory workers object and, moved by 
their objections, the government steps in to forbid the factory 
closures. One could argue that the government’s intervention 
was the corporate analog of a compelled bodily restraint, a 
standard violation of decisional privacy rights.
73
 The corpora-
tion’s complaint would sound in decisional privacy, but would 
not depend on any individuals’ decisional privacy rights. In for-
bidding the relocation, the government would not be interfering 
with the rights of the managers, workers, or shareholders to 
decide where they wanted to work or invest. It would be inter-
fering with the corporation’s decision about where it wanted to 
run its operations. And if we think the corporation’s decision 
should be protected as a matter of right, then we must sub-
scribe to the idea that corporations have rights of self-
determination analogous to, but not overlapping with, individ-
uals’ rights of self-determination. That is, corporations have 
primary decisional privacy rights. Again, and as with all pri-
 
supra note 17 and accompanying text; see also Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sov-
ereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the Constitution?, 58 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 445, 446 (1983) (“The Court itself has used the unfortunate term ‘privacy’ 
for this foundational idea, but philosophers, reading between the lines of the 
leading judicial opinions, have had no difficulty identifying it as the concept 
we have often called personal autonomy or self-determination . . . .” (footnote 
omitted)). We are agnostic here about the usefulness of retaining the label of 
“privacy” to describe various rights and values at stake in legal decisions. 
What matters is the underlying substance. 
 73. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 535, 543 (1942) (striking 
down a statute mandating sterilizations for those who had two or more felony 
convictions); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
1340 (2d ed. 1988) (“[T]he meaning of Skinner is that whether one person’s 
body shall be the source of another life must be left to that person and that per-
son alone to decide.”).  
  We do not take a position regarding how background legal rules 
should deal with this situation of factory closings and firings. One statutory 
approach might require giving notice of the factory closing. Another might ar-
gue that employees should have some governance authority over these kinds 
of decisions. Yet a third might provide fired employees with retraining bene-
fits. These possibilities, however, do not detract from the main point that deci-
sional autonomy concerns may arise for organizations as well as individual 
persons. 
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mary corporate rights, individual interests would ground the 
corporation’s rights. In the factory relocation case, the relevant 
interests would be those of shareholders and other owners who 
prefer that the corporation increase profits by pursuing a busi-
ness strategy designed to reduce costs. But the corporation’s 
right to decide where and how it will operate is the corpora-
tion’s in the first instance.  
With that said, our aim here is not to defend particular in-
stances of corporate decisional privacy rights. It is instead to 
argue that Pollman’s analysis occludes even the possibility of 
their existence in contravention of corporate rights jurispru-
dence, both as it is and as it should be. 
III.  THE MANY MEANINGS OF PRIVACY   
At this point, we step back from critiquing Professor 
Pollman’s proposed test and engage its substantive results. Our 
approach here is normative: When and why should corporations 
enjoy rights to privacy? To advance the inquiry, we follow other 
theorists in categorizing privacy along three dimensions and 
then suggest briefly how these different meanings of privacy af-
fect how we think about organizations asserting legal rights to 
protect these different kinds of privacy. The three dimensions 
of privacy are (1) “decisional privacy” in one’s personal life, (2) 
“informational privacy” about one’s activities, and (3) “local pri-
vacy” protecting particular places (such as one’s home or of-
fice).
74
 
A. DECISIONAL PRIVACY 
As we have seen, a right to “decisional privacy” involves 
cases in which one may respond to inquiries about certain per-
 
 74.  See, e.g., RÖSSLER, supra note 6, at 9, 79–168; Schwartz, supra note 
72, at 2058 & n.11 (identifying, in addition to informational and decisional 
privacy, “a third kind of privacy: physical privacy, or the ability to be undis-
turbed at home”); see also Anita L. Allen, Privacy and Reproductive Liberty, in 
“NAGGING” QUESTIONS: FEMINIST ETHICS IN EVERYDAY LIFE (Dana E. Bush-
nell ed., 1995) (identifying four tiers of privacy: decisional, informational, bodi-
ly integrity and self-determination, and privacy at home); Kang, supra note 
55, at 1202–03 (describing decisional, informational, and physical privacy). 
Unlike Allen, we treat bodily integrity and self-determination as an integral 
part of decisional privacy, but in other respects follow the three-part schemes 
advanced by Allen, Rössler, and Schwartz. We also do not take a strong posi-
tion on these categories. We agree with the general sense of many commenta-
tors as well as courts that “privacy” is an expansive concept that is not easily 
defined or neatly conceptualized. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying 
text.  
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sonal issues that “it’s none of your business.”
75
 It refers to a 
zone of “personal space” in which individual adult people may 
make decisions autonomously and free from outside interfer-
ence. As one scholar defines the value underlying this kind of 
privacy: “Decisional privacy and its protection establishes a 
space for manoeuvre in social action that is necessary for indi-
vidual autonomy.”
76
 An emblematic example is reflected in the 
sex-and-reproduction jurisprudence in the United States Su-
preme Court and illustrated in cases such as Griswold v. Con-
necticut,
77
 Roe v. Wade,
78
 and Lawrence v. Texas.
79
 These cases 
demonstrate how at least one area in modern social life is 
marked off as “private” from the intrusive reach of government 
regulation.
80
 
On first glance, it may appear obvious that an organiza-
tional person cannot have sex or become pregnant, and there-
fore it would be absurd to say that an organization could assert 
a decisional right of privacy that would not be directly deriva-
tive of individual rights.
81
 Planned Parenthood, for example, is 
an organization that regularly brings lawsuits claiming to pro-
tect the constitutional rights of individual women under the 
Roe v. Wade line of cases.
82
 The American Civil Liberties Union 
is another organization that focuses on legal representation for 
individuals faced with alleged discrimination with respect to 
their decisions about sex or reproduction, as well as other pri-
vacy issues.
83
 These organizations may well have a broader 
view about the appropriate scope of constitutional rights of pri-
vacy, but they are clearly acting legally on behalf of individual 
 
 75.  RÖSSLER, supra note 6, at 81. 
 76.  Id. at 80; see also Allen, supra note 72; Schwartz, supra note 72. 
 77.  381 U.S. 479, 479 (1965) (recognizing a constitutional right to privacy 
regarding decisions to use contraception). 
 78.  410 U.S. 113, 114 (1973) (recognizing a constitutional right to privacy 
regarding decisions to continue a pregnancy or have an abortion).  
 79.  539 U.S. 558, 558 (2003) (recognizing a constitutional right to privacy 
regarding the choice of sexual partners). 
 80.  See also supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text. 
 81.  Cf. supra text accompanying notes 68–70 (advancing the argument 
that decisional privacy rights are non-delegable). 
 82.  See supra note 70. 
 83.  See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 564–65 (2002) (rejecting a 
broad challenge to the Child Online Protection Act under the First Amend-
ment right of freedom of speech). For an overview of the ACLU’s Reproductive 
Freedom Project, see Reproductive Freedom, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/ 
reproductive-freedom (last visited Mar. 2, 2015). The ACLU is also active in 
issues regarding “digital privacy” and “consumer privacy.” See Protecting Lib-
erties in the Digital Age, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/protecting-civil-liberties 
-digital-age (last visited Mar. 2, 2015). 
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people, at least in litigation. In our terms, organizations in  
these cases are asserting secondary rights. 
Further, there is no reason to think that only nonprofit or 
advocacy organizations can support individuals’ decisional pri-
vacy rights in this manner. We have already seen that hospi-
tals and clinics might do so, some of which are for-profit enti-
ties.
84
 And even less savory businesses might have a hand in 
advancing individual decisional privacy rights. 
Pollman, in fact, suggests a good example of a situation of 
organizational decisional privacy when discussing the case of 
Fleck & Associates, Inc. v. City of Phoenix.
85
 In this case, the 
Court of Appeals rejected a privacy claim brought by a for-
profit corporation that ran “a gay men’s social club.”
86
 The club, 
which was called Flex, charged annual, monthly, or daily 
“memberships” that granted access to business premises on 
which consensual sex acts took place.
87
 The club contested en-
forcement of a municipal ordinance banning any “‘live sex act 
business’ in which ‘one or more persons may view, or may par-
ticipate in, a live sex act for a consideration.’”
88
 As Pollman 
notes, the Court held that the club did not have “associational 
standing” to invoke rights of privacy on behalf of its member 
customers and explained its decision on rather formalistic 
grounds.
89
 On the merits, the district court also expressed the 
view that a for-profit business may not legitimately claim a 
right of privacy for itself when providing “public” venues for 
sex.
90
 
 
 84.  See supra text accompanying notes 68–69. Although the line between 
“business” and “nonprofit” organizations is important, it is not always a clear 
line, and hospitals present a good example of a kind of organization that is 
sometimes “for-profit” and sometimes “nonprofit.” See ORTS, supra note 2, at 
204 (describing “hospitals and other health care organizations” as well as “ed-
ucational institutions” as “borderline cases”); cf. Hansmann, supra note 59, at 
840–41, 862–73 (introducing the apt intermediate concept of a “commercial 
nonprofit”). We submit that for purposes of analysis regarding organizational 
privacy (as well as other issues, such as application of health care laws) this 
distinction should not be considered essential. We argue further against lean-
ing too heavily on a distinction between “public” and “private” organizations 
for purposes of privacy rights analysis in Part V below. 
 85.  471 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2006); Pollman, supra note 1, at 38–39. 
 86.  Fleck, 471 F.3d at 1102. 
 87.  Id. at 1102–03. 
 88.  Id. (citing PHOENIX, AZ CODE § 23–54(B)(3)–(C)). 
 89.  Pollman, supra note 1, at 39 & n.51 (observing that the court “formal-
istically reasoned” that a right of privacy could not extend to corporations and 
nodded to Morton Salt for authority).  
 90.  Fleck, 471 F.3d at 1103. The Supreme Court explicitly limited its 
holding in Lawrence v. Texas regarding a right of privacy of consenting adults 
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One does not have to think too hard, though, to come up 
with variations on the facts of Fleck that may pose a challenge 
to a blanket rule that organized groups could never invoke pri-
vacy rights regarding consensual sexual activity. Eliminate the 
“public” aspects of the case, for example, and consider a private, 
members-only social club involving sexual practices among con-
senting adults (use your imagination—we won’t supply details 
that are easy to conjure). Suppose that the police decide to raid 
the club, or harass patrons as they enter or exit. The police 
claim that the crackdown is aimed at curbing possible illegal 
activity (e.g., instances of commercialized sex), but the true mo-
tive is an effort to enforce public morality against the club’s lib-
ertine ways. The social club seeks to enjoin the harassment and 
files suit asserting a constitutional right of privacy. The club’s 
argument would be that individuals should be free to decide 
where and how they will have sex, and the club operates to fa-
cilitate their interests in a particular kind of sexual activity. 
The club itself, that is, should enjoy a right to decide what kind 
of sex it wants to support, and it should enjoy this right be-
cause individuals will be able to enjoy the full scope of their de-
cisional privacy rights around sexual activity only if there are 
spaces—real or electronic—that allow them to connect with 
 
to engage in sexual practices “in the confines of their homes” and not extend-
ing to “public conduct or prostitution.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567, 
578 (2003). Some commentators have questioned this limitation to locations of 
“private” property such as homes (i.e., residential houses and apartments). 
See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, Privacy, Property, and Public Sex, 18 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 1, 4 (2008) (arguing, in support of an expansion of the right of 
sexual privacy to include some “public” spaces, that “what should ultimately 
matter in determining the right’s ambit is not where the sex takes place but 
whether the sexual actors’ expectations of privacy are reasonable”). 
  A separate possible ground distinguishing Fleck from other decisional 
privacy cases is that the commodification of sexual activities differs from con-
sensual sexual practices that do not involve the exchange of money. We leave 
for others—or another day—discussion of these issues. There is an ongoing 
substantive debate, for example, about whether prostitution and other forms 
of sexual activities should be legalized. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, 
Prostitution and Civil Rights, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 13 (1993) (arguing 
against prostitution but admitting uncertainty about the appropriate legal re-
sponse); Scott R. Peppet, Prostitution 3.0?, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1989 (2013) (ex-
ploring whether prostitution services offered over the internet might eliminate 
traditional concerns about trading sex for money well enough to justify the le-
galization of these services). It is also a different question outside the scope of 
our Article whether commercial practices that commodify sex should be decid-
ed by constitutional interpretation of privacy or other rights, rather than by 
statutory legislation. 
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others who share their interests.
91
 Here too, then, the club 
would be asserting decisional privacy rights that originated 
with the club’s members. The fact that the club may be a for-
profit venture, moreover, would seem immaterial. 
More generally, one can also imagine other kinds of de-
mands for evidence of internal organizational decision-making 
that may deserve protection on grounds of decisional privacy. 
For example, a business corporation’s right to consult legal 
counsel seems appropriate to protect in a manner similar to at-
torney-client privileges accorded to individuals. Although the 
scope of the attorney-client privilege for business corporations 
and other organizations is usually considered a matter of ordi-
nary law, the availability of the privilege implicates “clients’ 
Constitutional rights to counsel” under the Sixth Amendment.
92
 
In cases such as Upjohn Co. v. United States, the Supreme 
Court has recognized and given scope to this privilege for busi-
ness corporations.
93
 Similarly to individuals, organizations 
must often consult lawyers to determine the best course of ac-
tion with respect to various activities and operations. Organiza-
tions must also make decisions internally about how to handle 
litigation (e.g., whether to settle a case or appeal a decision). 
Affording attorney-client privileges in these cases, then, pro-
tects a primary right of the organization to autonomy and, in 
this sense, to decisional privacy.  
 
 91.  Internet websites for “dating” and “hook ups” may often also fall into 
this category. See, e.g., Molly Wood, Led By Tinder, the Mobile Dating Game 
Surges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2015, at B8. 
 92.  David M. Brodsky, Updates on the Corporate Attorney-Client Privi-
lege, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 89, 92 (2007) (quoting The Decline of the Attorney-
Client Privilege in the Corporate Context, Survey Results, Presentation to the 
United States Congress and the United States Sentencing Commission (Mar. 
2006)). As Brodsky observes, the privilege recognizes a kind of “privacy” in this 
context. Id. at 91–92; see also Timothy P. Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 AM. 
U. L. REV. 59, 60 (2002) (“Attorneys and clients assessing their own relation-
ships believe the [attorney-client] privilege promotes candor, communication, 
and sound legal advice, and serves other important interests, such as protect-
ing privacy and ensuring loyalty.” (emphasis added)). 
 93.  449 U.S. 383 (1981). In Upjohn, the Court construed the Federal 
Rules of Evidence and principles of the common law to protect the “attorney 
work product” privilege of a company contesting a far-reaching discovery re-
quest in a tax case. Id. at 386–89, 397–402. The ability of a corporation to as-
sert the attorney-client privilege has been recognized at least since United 
States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915) (cited in 
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390).  
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B. INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY 
Another important kind of privacy involves the access, 
availability, and distribution of various kinds of information 
and data about people. Information that is deemed “personal”—
such as medical records, personal journals, intimate corre-
spondence between friends and lovers, and even unclothed or 
compromising photos or videos—should have legal protections.
94
 
This kind of “informational privacy” involves the extent to 
which the law exerts or allows an individual to have “control 
over what other people can know about oneself.”
95
 The question 
 
 94.  We implicitly rely here on an intuitive dichotomy between the public 
and private, hewing to the idea that what is private, or personal, should be 
shielded from public view. Helen Nissenbaum has developed an alternative 
account for capturing what is at stake in informational privacy. E.g., HELEN 
NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE 
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 1–11 (2010); Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Ap-
proach to Privacy Online, 140 DAEDALUS 32, 32 (2011) [hereinafter 
Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach]; Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy As Contex-
tual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 119 (2004). She refers to this account as 
“contextual integrity,” and it looks to the norms governing different contexts to 
determine whether a privacy violation has occurred. See, e.g., Nissenbaum, A 
Contextual Approach, supra at 119–25. More specifically, Nissenbaum has two 
kinds of norms in mind—norms of appropriateness and norms of flow. The 
first govern substance. For example, it is appropriate for someone to share her 
financial situation with her tax accountant but not necessarily with her ex-
tended family. It is also appropriate for someone to share religious practices 
with other members of her place of worship, but not to be forced to disclose her 
religion with her employer. See id. at 138–40. Norms of flow govern expecta-
tions around the amount of sharing, and the way the substance shared will be 
treated by others. Thus we expect friends to be open with us, and to treat sen-
sitive information we share with them as presumptively confidential. We do 
not have similar expectations about the way strangers will treat information 
about us that we make known, even if we do not intend that they come to 
know it. For example, the passenger who has a loud conversation on his cell 
phone during a train ride has no reasonable expectation that others will not 
disseminate the content of the conversation that they have been made to hear. 
See id. at 140–43. For Nissenbaum, these two sets of norms provide the indicia 
for determining privacy violations. As she writes, “a normative account of pri-
vacy in terms of contextual integrity asserts that a privacy violation has oc-
curred when either contextual norms of appropriateness or norms of flow have 
been breached.” Id. at 143. We believe that Nissenbaum’s account contributes 
appealing subtlety to the coarser public-private distinction. With that said, the 
insights into informational privacy that we offer here—and, in particular, 
whether corporations should enjoy informational privacy rights—are compati-
ble with either her account or the more traditional, dichotomous one that she 
contests. For that reason, we do not engage her theory further in this context 
(so to speak). 
 95.  RÖSSLER, supra note 6, at 111; see also Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 
YALE L.J. 475, 483 (1968) (“Privacy . . . is control over knowledge about one-
self.”). It is important to emphasize that informational privacy involves “not 
only our interest in determining whether personal information is revealed to 
another person but also our interest in determining to whom such information 
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here is whether organizations should also be able to assert 
claims of informational privacy rights. 
Again, we believe that Pollman underestimates the cir-
cumstances in which organizations might legitimately claim 
both primary and secondary organizational rights in situations 
involving informational privacy. Consider, for example, a vari-
ant on the Yahoo!-like situation discussed above, where the 
Chinese government demands personal information about 
someone who is suspected under Chinese criminal law of viola-
tions for speaking negatively about the Chinese government or 
Communist Party in a manner that the company deems a pro-
tected right of freedom of speech.
96
 And it is not only the Chi-
nese. In the United States, the secretive National Security 
Agency (NSA) has been revealed to have violated privacy rights 
under existing laws in thousands and perhaps millions of in-
stances.
97
 
 
is revealed.” In re Search Warrant, 71 A.3d 1158, 1177 (Vt. 2012); see also 
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC, 555 F.3d 996, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(“It is widely accepted that privacy deals with determining for oneself when, 
how and to whom personal information will be disclosed to others.”); Fried, 
supra, at 482 (“It is not true, for instance, that the less that is known about us 
the more privacy we have. Privacy is not simply an absence of information 
about us in the minds of others; rather it is the control we have over infor-
mation about ourselves.”). 
 96.  See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 97.  See, e.g., Barton Gellman, NSA Broke Privacy Rules Thousands of 
Times Per Year, Audit Finds, WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2013), http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-broke-privacy-rules 
-thousands-of-times-per-year-audit-finds/2013/08/15/3310e554-05ca-11e3-a07f-
49ddc7417125_story.html; see also David Cole, Must Counterterrorism Cancel 
Democracy?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 8, 2015), available at http://www 
.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2015/jan/08/must-counterterrorism-cancel 
-democracy (noting that Edward Snowden’s disclosures revealed that the NSA 
and others “have been collecting billions of electronic communications—
including the contents of phone calls, cell phone location data, texts, e-mails, 
chats, and contact lists—from wide swaths of people under no suspicion what-
soever”). For a legal discussion on privacy implications, see, for example, G. 
Alex Sinha, NSA Surveillance Since 9/11 and the Human Right to Privacy, 59 
LOY. L. REV. 861 (2013). One commentator has argued that the digital changes 
wrought by the NSA are so deep and widespread that the idea of “a right to 
privacy” should be abandoned in favor of reconceptualization of “a right to se-
curity.” Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 104 (2008). 
Note that Rubenfeld’s objective is not to argue against the importance of pri-
vacy rights; it is instead to argue that we should not expect privacy rights to 
give us the Fourth Amendment protections we want and expect from a demo-
cratic government. Privacy, that is, is the wrong conceptual foundation for a 
well-functioning Fourth Amendment. Id. at 118. Given that we are not con-
cerned with the Fourth Amendment per se, we do not consider Rubenfeld’s ar-
guments further here.  
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Pollman recognizes that for-profit corporations engaged in 
digital technology might have a role to play in safeguarding the 
privacy interests of their users.
98
 But she characterizes this role 
as merely “instrumental.”
99
 By contrast, given the stakes in-
volved here—and the organizational realities of the digital rev-
olution that effectively enlists private organizations as well as 
government to serve as “gatekeepers”— we believe that organi-
zations should also be allowed to invoke primary organizational 
rights of informational privacy against government intrusion 
(even, and perhaps especially, when widespread intrusions are 
presumptively justified by proclaimed goals of “national securi-
ty”).  
To illustrate this argument, consider that some internet 
and social media companies have adopted strong privacy poli-
cies in order to attract customers to their services.
100
 It would 
seem odd to suggest that these companies could not defend the 
privacy interests of their users directly, exerting primary 
rights, rather than in a strictly secondary or “derivative” man-
ner. For example, companies offering search engines, or email 
or internet service providers, might refuse to disclose to the 
NSA their encryption methods, and they might refuse to do so 
not merely to protect their users’ privacy rights but also their 
own work product.
101
 In other words, over and above the desire 
to preserve customers’ privacy, these corporations might have 
an independent interest in controlling who gets access to their 
encryption technology and how it is used. Recognizing a corpo-
rate primary right to informational privacy would protect that 
interest. 
If one accepts our view, a legal landscape emerges in which 
some organizations fight for privacy rights at the same time 
 
 98. Pollman, supra note 1 at 147–50. 
 99. Id. at 149. 
 100. Mozilla, for example, is a nonprofit search engine which makes a point 
of preserving the privacy of its users. See Get Smart on Privacy, MOZILLA, 
https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/privacy/tips (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). Other 
search engines such as DuckDuckGo and Ixquick market themselves as priva-
cy-friendly. A. Michael Froomkin, “PETs Must Be on a Leash”: How U.S. Law 
(and Industry Practice) Often Undermines and Even Forbids Valuable Privacy 
Enhancing Technology, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 965, 970 (2013). Alternatives to Face-
book have arisen after it became a public company. See, e.g., Jason Gilbert, 
Facebook Alternatives: 10 New Social Networks To Join if Facebook’s Too Cor-
porate For You, HUFFINGTON POST (May 17, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/16/facebook-alternatives_n_1522647 
.html.  
 101.  New cell phones from Google and Apple, for example, have built-in 
encryption that the companies themselves cannot decode. Cole, supra note 97.  
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that other organizations (maybe even the same ones) are violat-
ing privacy rights. Consider large social media and internet 
companies for example. Google may simultaneously play two 
important roles. First, it protects privacy rights by asserting its 
own decisional authority and exerting both primary and sec-
ondary privacy rights against overintrusive government sur-
veillance. Second, and at the same time, Google’s business 
practices raise questions about whether its own use of consum-
ers’ information for “big data mining” and other commercial 
purposes violates privacy rights or expectations.
102
 We discuss 
the threat that business firms pose to privacy rights further be-
low in Part VI. Our point here is simply to observe that in the 
age of “big data” and the ever-increasing spread of internet, it 
seems out-of-step to argue that organizations should not play a 
role in asserting rights of informational privacy protection.
103
 If 
only lone individuals may bring legal claims, concerns ex-
pressed by some commentators about the “death of privacy” 
may well come true.
104
 
C. LOCAL PRIVACY 
A third kind of privacy involves the protection of particular 
places that are reserved for private or personal interactions. 
The paradigmatic example of this kind of “local privacy” is the 
“private home,” but it extends also to “the privacy of the house-
hold, of one’s flat or room, and thus the privacy of personal ob-
jects, which also form an inherent part of the privacy of these 
spaces.”
105
 The purpose of recognizing privacy of place includes 
promotion of intimate family and other personal relationships, 
as well as a place for solitude and reflection, “a room of one’s 
own.”
106
 
 
 102.  For some further examples, see Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach, 
supra note 94, at 32 (collecting examples).  
 103.  For expressions of general concerns regarding the loss of privacy in 
our digital age, see, for example, Dennis D. Hirsch, Protecting The Inner Envi-
ronment: What Privacy Regulation Can Learn From Environmental Law, 41 
GA. L. REV. 1 (2006); Joseph Jerome, Big Data: Catalyst for a Privacy Conver-
sation, 48 IND. L. REV. 213 (2014); Grover Joseph Rees, Slouching Toward 
Mordor, 14 ENGAGE 90 (2013); Derek S. Witte, Privacy Deleted: Is It Too Late 
To Protect Our Privacy Online?, 17 J. INTERNET L. 1 (2014).  
 104.  A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 
1461 (2000) (“The rapid deployment of privacy-destroying technologies by gov-
ernments and businesses threatens to make informational privacy obsolete.”).  
 105.  RÖSSLER, supra note 6, at 142.  
 106.  Id. at 142–43; see also VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE’S OWN (Har-
court First Harvest ed. 1989) (1929). 
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The value of local privacy relates to the social and legal 
recognition of private property. Hegel connects private property 
to self-actualization.
107
 One exerts one’s will, according to He-
gel, not just through one’s acts but also through one’s objects. If 
one’s personality, as manifested through objects, is not to be 
fleeting, then property rights are required, so that one can con-
trol the objects one has affected, and exclude others from inter-
fering with them.
108
 Contemporary theorists also argue for 
heightened protection for property that is personal: objects, real 
estate, or intangible property that has become wrapped up with 
one’s sense of self.
109
 In these ways, privacy and property rights 
are bound up with each other. It is not necessary to elaborate 
on this complicated relationship here.
110
 However, it is im-
portant to note that organizations assert private property 
rights—and these assertions involve at least some forms of le-
gal privacy protection both in theory and practice. In this con-
text, Pollman does not seem to give sufficient weight to the fact 
that courts have long applied some constitutional protections of 
privacy, specifically those under the Fourth Amendment’s pro-
tection against unreasonable searches and seizures, to business 
firms as well as other organizational persons.
111
  
In fact, private property requires some degree of legal pro-
tection from government intrusion even to exist. Constitutional 
protection against “unreasonable searches and seizures,” which 
 
 107. GEORG HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT ¶¶ 41–45 (T.M. Knox trans., 
Oxford Univ. Press First ed. 1952) (1821) (noting that an individual demon-
strates ownership of property by imposing his will on it and thereby “occupy-
ing” it). 
 108.  See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. 
L.J. 287, 333 (1988) (“Property becomes expression of the will, a part of per-
sonality, and it creates the conditions for further free action.”). But cf. Cohen, 
What Privacy Is For, supra note 17, at 1905 (“The self who is the real subject 
of privacy law and policy is socially constructed, emerging gradually from a 
preexisting cultural and relational substrate.”). 
 109.  See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. 
REV. 957, 959–61 (1982). 
 110.  For one treatment of the relationship between “public” and “private” 
in connection with privacy as a value, see RÖSSLER, supra note 6, at 169–92. 
One of us has elsewhere discussed the importance and conceptual difficulties 
involved in the “public-private distinction” with respect to property organized 
in business enterprises. ORTS, supra note 2, at 109–31. 
 111.  See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also Allen, supra note 
11, at 628–30 (collecting cases). Pollman observes that corporations have been 
accorded rights under the Fourth Amendment, but she does not discuss the 
connection that this protection has with values of privacy. Pollman, supra note 
1, at 28. Instead, she seems to categorize Fourth Amendment cases as unre-
lated to privacy rights. Id. at 80–81. At most, she sees privacy as a considera-
tion to be “factored into” Fourth Amendment tests. Id. at 55.  
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often requires “warrants” to be issued only after an advance 
showing of “probable cause” for suspicion of illegal activity, 
constitute one significant support of private property.
112
 Cases 
have extended this principle to the context of private property 
organized in business form, including large corporate enter-
prises. “Plainly,” as the Supreme Court has observed, “a busi-
ness establishment or an industrial or commercial facility en-
joys certain protections under the Fourth Amendment.”
113
 
One commentator has observed that even within the 
Fourth Amendment context, “the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy [test] . . . takes on different meanings in different con-
texts.”
114
 We do not delve more deeply into these different 
meanings here. If one agrees that the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects privacy, however, and if one agrees that organizational 
persons, including business firms, may legitimately assert con-
stitutional protections, then the normative and empirical asser-
tions that privacy rights of organizations are minimal must be 
revised. At the very least, we should recognize that we may not 
 
 112.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Another important constitutional protection 
guarantees private property against uncompensated “takings.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. V (prohibiting the “tak[ing]” of “private property” for “public use” 
without “just compensation”).  
 113.   Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235 (1986). In 
Dow, the Court recognized that business corporations may assert protection of 
“reasonable expectations of privacy” under the Fourth Amendment, but held 
that this protection did not extend to aerial outdoor photography conducted by 
agents of the Environmental Protection Agency. Id. at 235, 238–39. An accom-
panying opinion of four Justices lamented that this holding marked “a drastic 
reduction in the Fourth Amendment protections previously afforded to private 
commercial premises under our decisions.” Id. at 244 (Powell, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). “Fourth Amendment protection of privacy inter-
ests in business premises,” the opinion noted, is based on “precedents [that] 
leave no doubt that proprietors of commercial premises, including corpora-
tions, have the right to conduct their business free from unreasonable official 
intrusion.” Id. at 245 (citations omitted).  
 114.  Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 503, 549 (2007). Kerr describes four different “models” as involving “a 
probabilistic model,” “a private facts model,” “a positive law model,” and “a pol-
icy model.” Id. at 503. All of them refer to privacy considerations.  
  Digital technologies and the ubiquitous spread of computers and the 
internet raise particularly difficult problems in the Fourth Amendment con-
text. “Personal computers [and smart phones],” as one court has observed, “of-
ten store every aspect of a citizen’s personal life.” In re Search Warrant, 71 
A.3d 1158, 1180 (Vt. 2012); see also Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a 
Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 533 (2005) (“Computers are like con-
tainers in a physical sense, homes in a virtual sense, and vast warehouses in 
an informational sense.”); Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Comput-
ers and Computer Data, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 78 (1994) (“[T]he massive 
storage capacity of modern computers creates a high risk of overbroad, wide-
ranging searches and seizures.”). 
2015] PRIVACY AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERSONS 2315 
 
be able to arrive at a determinate answer as to whether a par-
ticular form of organization should enjoy a right to privacy in 
general terms. Variations among kinds and purposes of organi-
zations, as well as different meanings and rationales for pro-
tecting values of “privacy,” counsel a more cautious and delib-
erative approach.  
IV.  BEYOND CORPORATIONS   
It is not only Professor Pollman’s conception of the mean-
ing and circumstances justifying corporate constitutional priva-
cy rights that is, we believe, too narrow. There is another sense 
in which the scope of her project might be profitably enlarged. 
Pollman’s focus is explicitly on “corporations” and whether cor-
porations as presumptive “persons” have a “right to privacy.”
115
 
We agree with Pollman that at least for matters of convenience 
and convention, the law has created and recognized “corpora-
tions” as legal “persons” that have the ability to have “stand-
ing” and raise various substantive claims in court.
116
 We agree 
also that the term “corporation” is an expansive legal concep-
tion that embraces (at least in U.S. law) both business enter-
prises and nonprofit organizations.
117
 In addition, and not men-
tioned by Pollman, the “corporation” is also a convenient legal 
form used for municipalities and townships (e.g., “the corpora-
tion limit of X city” signs that one sees on highways in the 
United States). The idea of the “corporation,” then, is an even 
more flexible term than Pollman recognizes, and it is used by 
various kinds of collective groups of people for different purpos-
es.
118
 
Furthermore, Pollman’s analysis is limited by a focus on 
“corporations” without recognizing also that any principles re-
garding privacy should apply to other “non-corporate” groups as 
well. With respect to business enterprises, for example, there is 
no reason that an analysis regarding privacy should not extend 
to partnerships, limited liability companies, and even sole pro-
 
 115.  Pollman, supra note 1, at 27. 
 116.  See, e.g., ORTS, supra note 2, at 27–28, 40–50.  
 117.  Pollman, supra note 1, passim (referring to the prevalent use of “cor-
porations” for both businesses and nonprofit organizations); see also ORTS, su-
pra note 2, at 200–15 (discussing the difference between profit and nonprofit 
enterprises using different legal forms). 
 118.  For an overview of the historical conceptual development of the term, 
see ORTS, supra note 2, at 127–28. See also ALFRED F. CONARD, 
CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 127–32 (1976).  
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prietorships, as well as business corporations.
119
 The Supreme 
Court has agreed with this approach and insisted that, for 
many legal issues, the specific form of enterprise is irrelevant 
for purposes of constitutional analysis. For example, the consti-
tutional protection of corporate business firm records extends 
to other organizational business persons, as well as labor un-
ions.
120
 In other words, there is nothing inherently special about 
using a “corporate” form that should make a major difference 
with respect to a constitutional analysis regarding various pri-
vacy rights claims as they apply to organized groups. Although 
it may be true that business firms operating on the profit mo-
tive may deserve greater regulatory scrutiny for some purposes, 
it does not follow that jurists or scholars should be more skepti-
cal about privacy (or other) rights when it comes to for-profit 
corporations relative to other kinds of firms.  
As Pollman recognizes, different outcomes may revolve 
around further questions, such as the size and scope of a busi-
ness corporation: a very large firm traded on public stock mar-
kets versus a very small firm closely held by a more limited 
group of people.
121
 One may imagine that concerns about priva-
cy may to some extent track organizational size. One-person 
corporations, for example, are allowed, and it would be wrong 
and overly formalistic to say that simply because a single per-
son is acting as a “corporation” would mean that all rights of 
privacy should be rejected.
122
 Similarly, nothing would seem to 
turn in principle on whether a particular nonprofit organiza-
tion was “incorporated” or organized in some other fashion. For 
example, whether a labor union, a political party, a church or 
synagogue, or any other political or social association of people 
adopts the legal form of an unincorporated association, part-
 
 119.  In modern legal practice, business participants have a wide degree of 
choice regarding the legal form of enterprise, including all of the options listed 
in the text and more. For a detailed review of these options, see, for example, 
ORTS, supra note 2, at 175–222. 
 120.  In Bellis v. United States, for example, the Court made clear that 
“any thought that the principle formulated in [its previous] decisions was lim-
ited to corporate records was put to rest in United States v. White, [322 U.S. 
694 (1944)]. In White, we held that an officer of an unincorporated association, 
a labor union, could not claim his privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination to justify his refusal to produce the union’s records pursuant to 
a grand jury subpoena.” 417 U.S. 85, 89 (1974); cf. also id. (listing other Su-
preme Court cases where the Court denied the privilege against self-
incrimination to other kinds of unincorporated entities). 
 121.  Pollman, supra note 1, at 62–84.  
 122.  Pollman would seem to agree. See id. at 78. Although historically 
there was some reluctance to allow one-person corporations, they are now 
widely accepted as legitimate. See, e.g., ORTS, supra note 2, at 155, 178–80. 
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nership, or trust rather than a “corporation” does not seem par-
ticularly relevant to determining how particular cases regard-
ing rights of privacy should be decided.  
In general, then, we believe that one should not make too 
much of whether a “corporation” is used as a form either of 
business or nonprofit enterprise. The relevant considerations 
should instead focus on the particular context of the claim and 
the relationship of a particular organizational person (no mat-
ter its legal form) to the claim. 
In this respect we see nothing wrong with the approaches 
taken by courts in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
(and elsewhere) suggesting as follows: “Privacy rights accorded 
to artificial entities are not stagnant, but depend on the cir-
cumstances.”
123
 In contrast to Pollman’s conclusion that courts 
should not usually recognize rights of privacy for corporations 
(and especially, in her view, large public corporations), we rec-
ommend a more neutral starting point that will better allow for 
an incremental legal approach that would address particular 
kinds of privacy rights raised by particular organizational per-
sons over time, sensitive to the circumstances and interests 
motivating the privacy claims. To say, as some courts have 
done, that tests will “depend on the circumstances” leaves open 
the possibility for precedents to develop, which will in turn 
guide courts with respect to particular kinds of issues, without 
attempting to draw bright lines in advance against constitu-
tional and statutory development. 
V.  ORGANIZATIONAL COMPOSITION   
We shift now from considerations of organizational form to 
considerations of who constitutes the organization in question. 
Professor Pollman’s approach does not undertake a careful 
analysis of the relevant “participants” or “stakeholders” in a 
business enterprise, or other nonprofit or social organization. If 
the “private rights” of an organization are “derivative” or con-
ceptually dependent on the membership of the group (our sec-
ondary organizational rights), then it is rather important to de-
termine who counts as members of the group. Similarly, if an 
organization’s rights are “instrumental” with respect to protect-
ing other individual rights or if the organization enjoys what 
 
 123.  United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 411 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Other 
cases taking a similar approach and cited by Pollman include Tavoulareas v. 
Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on other 
grounds, 737 F.2d 1170 (1984); and Roberts v. Gulf Oil Corp., 195 Cal. Rptr. 
393 (Ct. App. 1983). Pollman, supra note 1, at 40–43. 
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we call primary organizational rights, then we will need to 
know which individuals the organization may seek to benefit or 
protect and why the organization should be permitted to benefit 
or protect them. 
Again, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby pro-
vides an example. For purposes of the Court’s analysis, it ap-
pears that the controlling owners and managers of Hobby Lob-
by (and similar corporations) are those whose interests 
primarily counted with respect to the recognition of a corporate 
right of religious freedom. As one of us has previously argued, 
however, this definition of the relevant “members” or “partici-
pants” in the firm seems to leave out the employees—and it is 
not clear conceptually that this result should follow.
124
 With re-
spect to rights to privacy, the same kind of indeterminacy oc-
curs—and it is perhaps even more complex given the various 
kinds of contexts in which privacy claims arise. 
One important question, then, is “who composes the corpo-
ration or other organizational entity” when a claim of privacy is 
advanced by a firm? Pollman gestures broadly to stakeholder 
theory as it has been developed in business ethics research.
125
 
But stakeholder theory is notoriously vague and contradictory 
concerning who actually counts as a stakeholder in a firm and 
what this actually means in practice.
126
 It is certainly true that 
 
 124.  Orts, supra note 38. As mentioned above, the two co-authors do not 
necessarily agree on this interpretation. See supra note 38. 
 125.  Pollman, supra note 1, at 73. 
 126.  One large difference recognized in business ethics concerns the use of 
stakeholders as an “instrumental” term or as a “normative” term. An instru-
mental use of the term relegates various categories of “stakeholders” to com-
ponents of a firm’s overall strategy to advance the economic interests of own-
ers and managers. A normative use of the term asks “who counts” as a 
relevant interest for the firm. For an overview of this important distinction, 
see Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the Cor-
poration: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 65 
(1995). For arguments for a limitation of the normative view of stakeholders to 
a relatively narrow set of interests in the firm (though often including employ-
ees), see Eric W. Orts & Alan Strudler, Putting a Stake in Stakeholder Theory, 
88 J. BUS. ETHICS 605 (2009); Eric W. Orts & Alan Strudler, The Ethical and 
Environmental Limits of Stakeholder Theory, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 215 (2002). 
As Pollman notes, a similarly narrow view was previously advocated by Max 
Clarkson. Pollman, supra note 1, at 73 n.211 (citing Max B.E. Clarkson, A 
Stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and Evaluating Corporate Social Per-
formance, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 92 (1995)). 
  Stakeholder theory is vague because some “broad” versions include 
people dealing with firms (e.g., suppliers, customers, government, and even 
tort victims) and other “narrow” versions include only business participants 
with a specified “stake” at risk in the firm (e.g., investors, managers, and em-
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various participants and individuals within firms—or dealing 
with firms—may have privacy interests to assert as individu-
als. This observation, however, does not provide a basis for de-
termining when a firm may or may not assert privacy interests 
“derivatively,” “instrumentally,” or “primarily.”  
Here again, we believe that an incremental jurisprudential 
approach is recommended. Privacy issues may arise in a host of 
different circumstances, involving different elements of consti-
tutional and statutory law, as we have argued above in Part 
III. Modern organizations, including corporate business firms, 
are often complex and involve many different combinations of 
participants. Different business firms, as well as different non-
profit organizations, are also organized to pursue different ob-
jectives and advance different constellations of interests.
127
 Giv-
en this conceptual as well as empirical complexity, it makes 
sense to proceed cautiously and deliberately: updating princi-
ples of privacy to include corporations and other organizations 
when warranted, and cutting back their application when not 
justified or not conducive to the advancement of the values 
sought to be protected.  
VI.  WHEN ORGANIZATIONS VIOLATE PRIVACY RIGHTS   
Although we have been focusing on corporate privacy 
rights, we might also say, in some circumstances, that corpora-
tions and other social organizations have a moral duty to pro-
tect privacy rights of individuals. A host of issues in the new 
world of the internet involves precisely this question, with the 
European Union taking an assertive position in requiring pri-
vacy rights to be respected.
128
 Unpacking this problem leads 
then to another question that falls outside the scope of Profes-
sor Pollman’s analysis, though it would seem to offer an im-
portant complement to her work: When do corporations and 
other social organizations violate the rights of privacy of oth-
 
ployees). See, e.g., Orts & Strudler, Putting a Stake in Stakeholder Theory, su-
pra, at 607. 
 127.  On the diversity of purposes of business firms, see ORTS, supra note 
2, at 175–222. 
 128.  See supra note 7. For an account of different protections of privacy 
rights, see Michael C. James, A Comparative Analysis of the Right to Privacy 
in the United States, Canada and Europe, 29 CONN. J. INT’L L. 257 (2013). For 
a general discussion of the ways in which “information privacy is governed not 
just by governmental law but also by corporations via private governance,” see 
Marcy E. Peek, Information Privacy and Corporate Power: Towards a Re-
Imagination of Information Privacy Law, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 127, 127 
(2006). 
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ers?
129
 When considering the recognition of organizations’ rights 
of privacy, it seems appropriate to consider the fact that these 
organizations may also pose a threat to rights of privacy.  
Again, new internet-based business ventures have been 
generating controversy, such as Uber’s recent disclosure that it 
was threatening to examine its corporate travel records of a 
journalist who was criticizing the company.
130
 Companies often 
post strong privacy protection policies, but modern threats of 
privacy violations would seem to follow as much from intru-
sions by private firms and organizations as by government.
131
 
One might even imagine situations where a large organization 
asserts a right of privacy or other legal privilege against disclo-
sure as a strategy to protect itself from a challenge to practices 
that actually violate the rights of privacy of others (such as 
consumers and other “netizens” leaving electronic trails availa-
ble for “mining”).
132
 And the notion that corporations might 
have duties to respect individuals’ rights of privacy lends fur-
ther support to the idea that corporations might have their own 
organizational rights of privacy by casting the corporation as a 
member of the moral community, bound with other persons in 
reciprocal relations of respecting rights and duties. 
 
 129.  Interestingly, even though Pollman casts doubt on a corporate right 
to privacy in general, she recognizes that corporations may often come forward 
to protect employees and customers. See Pollman, supra note 1, at 72–77. As 
we discuss in Part III above, however, limiting one’s analysis to only “second-
ary organizational rights” rather than “primary organizational rights” signifi-
cantly constrains the potential for organizations to play this role. 
 130. See, e.g., Farhad Manjoo, A Start-Up Going So Fast It Could Miss a 
Turn, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2014, at A1. 
 131.  See, e.g., Froomkin, supra note 104 (canvassing various digital tech-
nological threats to privacy with a focus on the ability of private firms to in-
vade individuals’ rights); Sue Halpern, The Creepy New Wave of the Internet, 
N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 14, 2014), available at http://www.nybooks.com/ 
articles/archives/2014/nov/20/creepy-new-wave-internet (reviewing various 
new challenges to privacy created by new technologies associated with “the 
internet of things”). The famous failure of Google glasses, which has been 
called the “Silicon Valley’s Edsel,” however, indicates that many people retain 
significant expectations of privacy in everyday life. See Nick Bilton, Broken 
Glass, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2015, at E1. 
 132.  One example is the problem of recirculation of personal images meant 
to be private to websites that allow widespread distribution. Legal reforms 
may include holding internet media firms liable for individual privacy viola-
tions—and perhaps also, as we suggest, allowing some organizations to protect 
the privacy interests of customers or patrons who use their services. For an 
overview of this issue, though with other proposed solutions regarding copy-
right and criminal law, see Derek E. Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. L. REV. 
2025 (2014). 
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Our larger point is that we live in a modern world full of 
many kinds of organizations as well as individual people. Rele-
vant considerations about “privacy” in the twenty-first century 
involve not only a bilateral potential conflict between govern-
ment and individual citizens—business firms and nonprofit or-
ganizations are also an intrinsic institutional part of the social 
matrix. A useful reformulation of privacy rights, then, should 
include an expansive institutional understanding that includes 
a role of organizational persons as “rights bearing” as well as 
“duty bearing.” And future research following on foundations 
laid by Pollman and others will be needed for this kind of re-
formulation of privacy rights to occur. 
  CONCLUSION   
Our Article, we admit, raises many more questions than 
we answer. We also recognize that it is often easier to poke 
holes in someone else’s account than to build a coherent and vi-
able argument oneself. In conclusion, then, we reiterate the 
significant value that we see Professor Pollman as providing. 
She is to be commended for her important contribution to an 
emerging and difficult topic. 
Given the multivariate meanings of privacy, as well as the 
many different kinds of organizations, however, we do not 
think that broad claims about whether organizational persons 
can or should assert rights of privacy can be made easily. Al-
though Pollman recognizes the considerable complexity and 
controversy concerning different conceptions of privacy—both 
within the ambit of constitutional jurisprudence and more 
broadly—we do not think that there is sufficient theoretical 
grounding to support her claim that “most corporations in most 
circumstances should not have a constitutional right to priva-
cy.”
133
 Because the manner in which various kinds of privacy 
concerns may be raised has many manifestations and because 
of the many different kinds of organizations with different 
structures and purposes, we conclude that it is not particularly 
helpful—or conceptually supported—to make this sort of broad 
claim. We suggest instead that tough issues are involved in 
many different circumstances in which organizations may as-
sert privacy rights, and the question of whether corporations or 
other organized groups should be recognized as having the le-
gal authority to assert privacy concerns as a constitutional ar-
gument should remain open, awaiting particular fact-based 
 
 133.  Pollman, supra note 1, at 32, 84.  
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contexts to inform the future direction of the law.
134
 At some 
places, Pollman recognizes these limitations and refers to the 
need to consider “the purpose of the privacy right” as it is as-
serted in various circumstances.
135
 We believe, however, that 
the many meanings of privacy, and the many types and species 
of organizational forms, will press more strongly on developing 
case law and scholarly commentary than Pollman allows. And 
in any event, the emerging breadth and complexity of problems 
related to private rights and organizations are too great to al-
low for the statement of a general rule against the recognition 
of corporate privacy rights. 
We nevertheless agree with Pollman that courts will likely 
view claims of extensions of a constitutional right to privacy to 
organizational persons skeptically. In general, there are well-
known boundary questions about judicial expansions of a right 
to privacy in constitutional law.
136
 This hesitancy, though, is not 
necessarily connected to any conceptual line drawn by the fact 
that an organization such as a corporation is asserting a right 
rather than an individual. In the modern world—especially 
given the vast expansion of digital and internet technologies—
the meaning of privacy for individuals is closely connected to 
the legal and social respect for privacy given by organizations, 
including business enterprises and nonprofit organizations, as 
well as governments.
137
 More work has yet to be done on these 
questions—including foundational theoretical work on norma-
tive questions of the various jurisprudential meanings of priva-
cy in the twenty-first century.  
 
 134.  Pollman herself refers to “the open question of corporate privacy.” Id. 
at 33.  
 135.  See, e.g., id. at 62. 
 136.  For an extensive and influential examination of “rights of privacy and 
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